

| A Chronology of the 517th PIR (focusing on 2nd Battalion and E Company) | | | | | | |
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| This is a work in progress and I truly welcome comments and criticisms from 517th veterans, especially those who served in E Company and 2nd Battalion - Contact: Mark Landreth [landmark54@hotmail.com] | | | | | | |
| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
| 3/15/43 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment Activated at Camp Toccoa, assigned to the Airborne Command | Camp Toccoa (GA) | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 4/15/43 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Assigned to 17th Abn Division (HQ at Camp Mackall) | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 4/16/43 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | At age 19 + 1 week, Roy Landreth is drafted by the army. He volunteers for the paratroopers and is assigned to the 517th. He went on to spend 29 years in the Army, 26 of them on jump status. During his career he rose from E1-E7, WOJG, and 2LT through COL during his service. His three favroite jobs were Company First Sgt, Company Commander and Director of the Airborne Department at Ft. Lee. | Greenville, SC | |
| 4/43 - 7/43 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Basic Training for the 517th is conducted by a cadre (or some members) from the 506th. | Camp Toccoa (GA) | |
| | | | | According to Tom Cross, "There were few or no members of the 506th. Most of the training was done by officers and NCO's who had studied the manual one evening, then guided the men through the exercises the next day." Another source revealed the officers and NCOs "tag teamed" the soldiers. One group would read the manual at night and work the soldiers the next day, while a second group would read the manuals during the morning and would work the men in the afternoon --- or some similar situation | | Tom Cross, was the I think second CO of E Co., then XO of 2nd Bn. He was later the CO of 3rd Bn. |
| 8/8/43 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Moved to Camp Mackall | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 8/8/43 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | 517th moves to Camp Mackall (NC) where additional individual training is conducted. | Camp Mackall (NC) | |
| 9/1/43 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Two weeks of pre-jump training and then three weeks parachute training. | Ft. Benning (GA) | |
| 10/43 - 02/44 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Training. | Camp Mackall (NC) | |
| Late 12/43, incl Xmas | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Sgt. Roy Landreth and Cpl. Bill Myers on TDY to Astoria, Oregon to retrieve an AWOL paratrooper. Myers spent Christmas at home in IN and met Landreth afterwards in Chicago. | In transit to Astoria, Oregon. | |
| 1/1/44 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | 517th conducts mass jump and exercise in the area around Southern Pines, NC. | | |
| 2/8/44 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Moved to TN maneuver area | Somewhere in east Tennessee. | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| Beginning in February '44 | 6 week period | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | Tennessee Maneuvers. Feb '44 + 6 weeks is, at earliest mid-March, the latest mid-April | Somewhere in east Tennessee. | |
| 3/5/44 | | 517th PIR | 17th Abn Div | 517th returned to Camp Mackall | Camp Mackall (NC). | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 3/10/44 | | 517th PIR | Detached from 17th Abn Div | Relieved from 17th Abn Division and attached to 2nd Army | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |

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|---------------------------------|------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| Sometime between 3/10/44 ~ 4/44 | | 517th PIR ~> 517th PRCT | | 517th PRCT formed when 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion & 596th Airborne Engineer Company were added to the 517th PIR. | Camp Mackall (NC). | |
| | | | | <i>DOM/DOH/POM/POH (?) inspection conducted by 2nd Army - 517th scores higher on the PT tests than any other unit tested in the Army</i> | | |
| 5/7/44 | | 517th PRCT | | PRCT Departs Camp Mackall for Camp Patrick Henry | Camp Patrick Henry (VA). | |
| 5/7/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Staged at Camp Patrick Henry, VA | Camp Patrick Henry (VA). | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 5/17/44 | | 517th PRCT | | 517th PRCT departs from Hampton Roads for European-African-Mediterranean Theatre (EAMET). | Camp Patrick Henry (VA). | |
| 5/17/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Departed Hampton Roads P/E | Hampton Roads (VA) | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 5/28/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Arrived Italy | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 5/31/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Arrival in EAMET. | Naples, Italy. | |
| Early June | | 517th PRCT | | | Bagnoli, Italy (near Naples). | |
| Early June | | 517th PRCT | | During this period, the RCT was based in an area referred to as "The Crater" outside Naples (possibly in/near Mt. Vesuvius?). | Naples, Italy. | |
| 6/14/44 | | 517th PRCT | 36th Infantry Division (IV Corps) | Strikes camp and move to beach to await transport by LST (Landing Ship, Tank) and LCI (Landing Craft, Infantry) | | |
| Mid June, possibly 16-Jun-44 | | 517th PRCT | 36th Infantry Division | 517th PRCT stops in Anzio for a couple of hours then receives orders to proceed to Civitavecchia. | Transported to Civitavecchia. Most by LCI, some by LST. | |
| 6/17/44 | | 517th PRCT | 36th Infantry Division | Committed to combat under VI Corps along Hwy 1 north of Rome | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 6/17/44 | | 517th PRCT | 36th Infantry Division | Landing unopposed by Germans, except for long range artillery. | arrives in Civitavecchia | |
| | | | 36th Infantry Division | | Moved from Civitavecchia toward Grosseto via truck then on foot | |
| 6/18/44 | | 2nd Bn | 36th Infantry Division | 2nd Bn provides a flanking action during 517th's first combat | N.E. of Grosseto on Hwy 223 into the Moscona Hills | |
| 6/19/44 | | 2nd Bn | 36th Infantry Division | Captured village of Montesario | Montesario (hilltop village) | |

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| 22-Jun-44 to 23-Jun-44 | | 2nd Bn | 36th Infantry Division | bivouacked | On a ridgeline South of Gavarrano | |
| 6/24/44 | | 517th PRCT | 36th Infantry Division | closed with 142nd Inf (36th Inf Div) | PRCT moves across Piombino Valley | |
| 6/24/44 | | 2nd Bn | 36th Infantry Division | Entered to capture Fallonica along Highway One (Hwy 1). Fallonica was the German's first determined stand. They withdrew and 2nd Bn took up a defensive position on the high ground to the North of Fallonica. Shortly after we established the defensive position, the Germans counterattacked with tanks. We stopped them | On the eastern outskirts of Fallonica | |
| late June-44 | | 517th PRCT | 36th Infantry Division | Detached from 36th Inf Div. Attached to IV Corps and assigned to Corps reserve | | |
| late June-44 | | 517th PRCT | IV Corps | | 517th moves to an area referred to as the "Olive Grove" near Frascati (7 miles South of Rome). | |
| 7/2/44 | | 517th PRCT | Detached from IV Corps Attached to 1st Airborne Task Force (7th Army) | detached from IV Corps reserve and assigned to 1st Abn Task Force commanded by BG Robert Frederick | Frascati | |
| 8/10/44 | | 517th PRCT | | PRCT sealed off prior to Dragoon | Frascati | |
| 8/15/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Assaulted Southern France | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 8/15/44 | 0200 | E Co. | | E Co. and 2nd Bn emplaned prior to jump in 34 C-47s of the 440th TC Group, commanded by Col. Krebs | Ombrone Airfield, 8 miles south of Crossette | |
| 8/15/44 | | 2nd Bn | | Order of jump was to be D Co., Hq. Co., E Co., F Co. | | |
| 8/15/44 | 0435 | E Co. | | Jumped into Southern France | Vicinity of LaMotte | |
| 8/15/44 | | 2nd Bn | | Jumped into predesignated Drop Zone 1.5 miles southwest of La Motte. The 2nd Bn. had the best jump, still, the Bn Was still scattered over some distance | near LaMotte | |
| 8/15/44 | 0435 | E Co.(+/-) | | Part of E Co. assembles | near LaMotte | |
| 8/15/44 | | | | E Company held position near Les Arcs and helped clear Germans from what I remember as the Rhone Valley. LTC Seitz was leading us. We had a mortar man, Charles Lemen, killed. He remains in Draguignan Cemetery. | | Source: Gene Brissey's notes on first draft of Chronology |
| 8/15/44 | | 2nd Bn | | 2nd Battalion mission: hold high ground commanding the approach to the beaches and prevent the Germans from attacking the sea landing. | | |
| 8/15/44 | 1645 | E Co.(+/-) | | | Proceed from LaMotte to Trans-en-Provence | |

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| 8/15/44 | 2245 | E Co.(+/-) | | | Arrived in Trans-en-Provence | |
| 8/15/44 | 2343 | E Co.(+/-) | | Ordered by Lt. Col Seitz to move into pre-designated defensive position & held it until relieved | | |
| 8/15/44 | 2100 | E Co.(+/-) | | | Relieved by 551st Prcht Bn | |
| 8/15/44 | 2100 | E Co.(+/-) | | Moved toward Regimental CP | north of Les Arcs | |
| 8/15/44 | | 2nd Bn | | 2nd Bn joins 1st Bn near Les Arcs to fight against German counterattack (E Co. not involved as they were moving to relieve A Co.) | | |
| 8/16/44 | | 2nd Bn | | Arrived at Regimental CP | north of Les Arcs | |
| 8/16/44 | 0900 | E Co.(+/-) | | moved into defensive position relieving part of A Co. | Vicinity of Les Arcs | |
| 8/17/44 | during the p.m. | E Co.(+/-) | | Moved to 2nd Bn CP. Stayed there until 8/18 @ 1330 | Vicinity of Les Arcs | |
| 8/18/44 | 1630 | E Co.(+/-) | | Occupied defensive positions until 0500 on 8/20 | NE of La Motte | |
| D + 3 | | 517th PRCT | | Mission: cover Eastern flank of 7th army | Fayence-La Napoule | |
| D + 3 + | | 2nd Bn | | assigned the capture of Fayence and Callian | Fayence + Callian | |
| 8/20/44 | 0500 | E Co.(+/-) | | Occupied defensive positions until 0500 on 8/20 | NE of La Motte | |
| 8/21/44 | | 2nd Bn | | captured those villages | Fayence + Callian | |
| | | | | The 517th also captured Saint Vallier, Grasse, Bouyon and La Roquette. | | |
| 8/21/44 - 9/4/44 | | 2nd & 3rd Battalions | | captured | Ventebren and Tete de Lavina | |
| 8/24/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Took St. Vallier | St. Vallier | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| | | | | E Co.'s attack on La Roquette was one of the most daring and successful operations of the 517th. E Co. distinguished itself and received a commendation from General Frederick. | | |
| 8/27/44 | early a.m. | 2nd Bn / 517 | | 2nd Bn. Moved along highway Bezadun Les Alpes - La Broc and approached the Var River opposite the town of La Roquette, which was situated on the eastern bank and commanded the only available bridge across the Var in this zone | | CPT Walter Irwin's monograph for the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course |
| 8/27/44 | | | | Bn had received orders that the bridge in this area was to be secured intact if at al possible for a supply route to be used by the supporting units on the advance to the east. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | A combat patrol consisting of a reinforced platoon had been sent to the bridge. They discovered the enemy making determined attempts to blow the bridge. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | mid-a.m. | | | 2nd Bn CP established in the town of La Broc | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | LTC Seitz felt if a force could effect a crossing on the bridge and neutralize the demolitions, that they could establish a bridgehead sufficient to allow the remainder of the regiment to advance. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | F Co, reinforced with a section of LMG from the Bn. Hq. Co. was given the mission. However, after surveying the terrain, and the nearly perfect defensive positions on the east bank that the cost wouldn't have been worth the casualties. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | Reconnaissance patrols were dispatched to find possible crossing sites but in each case the area was well covered by small arms and mortar fire.. | La Broc | ibid. |

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| 8/27/44 | | | | Attempts by the attached engineer platoon of the 596th Abn Engineers to clear a path through the extensive minefield proved unsuccessful due to enemy fire and the very nature of the emplaced mines. Six foot wooden poles had been set in the river approximately 25 yards apart. From the tops of each pole wire was strung to connect them and suspended between each pole, hanging down approximately 8" from the ground were 170mm H.E. projectiles. Additionally, AP mines had been sprinkled throughout the area. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | Weather was extremely warm during the day, but disagreeably chilly after dark. No rain had fallen for some time and the scrub growth was dry and highly flammable. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | Terrain consisted of jagged, rock studded scrub covered mountain ridges rising to a height of nearly 1500 meters at the crest.. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | This being the dry season of the year, the river was approximately 150 to 200 yards in width with a reported average depth of 3 to 5 feet. The bridge across the Var River in this area was of concrete construction, two lanes in width, pier supported, and approximately 300 yards in length. Mountain ridge due east of the bridge site rises to a height of 600 meters and commands the approaches on either bank. Highway 202 parallels the east bank of the river southward to Nice. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | Enemy in area was estimated to be a reinforced Inf. Bn. with positions on ridge line situated east of, and paralleling the Var with approximately one company estimated to be in and in the vicinity of La Roquette. Enemy was well dug in and had prepared positions in the area to command all approaches to the bridge and had organized all key terrain features along the east bank of the river. Extensive AP mine-fields were located in the river bed in the area of the bridge and extended approximately one mile north and south. Wire barriers had been erected on all likely avenues of approach to the east bank defenses. Traveling patrols moved along Highway 202 during hours of darkness. Support was in form of an unknown number of mortars (80mm and 120mm) and a few pieces of small caliber mountain artillery. No tanks were reported in the area. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | 1200 | | | Bn situation was stagnant. F Co's forward movement had ceased. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | 1200 | | | "Louie" a member of the well organized FFI Forces (*) in the area volunteered his services and knowledge of the terrain. After verification of his status from Task Force Headquarters "Louie" stated that, down river approximately one mile, the channel was shallow and that the area was now unguarded and, further, the FFI had a schedule of all enemy traveling patrols on Highway 202. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | To preclude any hint of a crossing in this area, all patrol activity was withdrawn until darkness. Thus, with the stage set, LTC Seitz issued his order that the 2nd Bn would attack at 1700 on 28 August, seize the bridge across the Var, the hill mass to the east of the bridge and the town of La Roquette. Then, on order, would advance to the next objective of Levens. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | Co F would continue pressure on the bridge until H Hour, Co. D would move to an area, generally, west and south of Co. F and support the crossing by fire and would be committed on Bn order. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | At H Hour, Co F would force a bridge crossing and seize the high ground east of the bridge. Co. D would advance rapidly to the vicinity of La Roquette and assist E Co. should it be needed. | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | E Co. + | | Co. E, reinforced (by HQ Co. machine gun section, rocket section and demolitions personnel) was given the mission of making a river crossing by stealth, 0200 28 August, moving to the rock-mound ridge in rear of La Roquette, cut the La Roquette - Levens highway at 1500 hours and attack the town of La Roquette from the rear at 1630 hours. Artillery liaison would be with E Co. and would place fire on enemy positions on bridge site commencing 1530 hours. | La Broc | ibid. |

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| 8/27/44 | | | | Upon receipt of the Bn. order activity increased in Co E area. While E Co. C.O. and the officers discussed a plan of action the company busied itself with preparations. All loose metal was either taped, tied, or discarded; 60mm mortars were reduced to two crews and extra ammunition carried by the surplus crews; personnel were instructed to carry the very minimum of equipment and issued grenade bags and extra white phosphorus and fragmentation grenades; 2/3 K rations would be carried and a hot meal fed before departure, the first since leaving Italy (12 days previously) | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | | | The attack plan of Co 3 was simple in nature. E Co (plus) would depart La Broc 0130 hours, 28 Aug 44, in order of 1st Plat, Com'd Grp, 2nd Plat, Wpns, and 3rd Plat, bringing up the rear and securing the tail. Company would cross the Var River at the indicated ford, move to a position 500 yards in rear of La Roquette and would remain until 1600 hours, at which time they would cut the La Roquette - Levens Highway and attack the town from the rear at 1630 | La Broc | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0100 | E Co. + | | The weather at 0100 hours, 28 Aug was clear, with a sliver of a moon. None of the usual fog had fallen and the bed of the river could be felt by the damp chill rising from the stream. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0130 | E Co. + | | At 0130 hours, E Co + passed through the security detachments of La Broc in single file, led by "Louie" and I & R Section guides and followed the tortuous path down the mountain side to the river crossing site. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | One can well imagine the difficulty of moving a group of men in the dark of night on flat terrain, increase this some hundredfold and the picture will equal the column of men moving down the side of the mountain, with equipment, over a rock strewn path. Progress was slow and control difficult. As radio silence would be observed this necessitated the passage of orders verbally along the column. This resulted in some confusion as to the original intent of the message, but did not seriously impede the progress down the mountain. Further difficulty was encountered in low hanging bushes slapping each person in turn and catching on items of equipment, causing no end of uncomplimentary comments from the men. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0215 | | | For some 45 minutes the column slipped, slid and grunted its way to the floor of the river bed and emerged on the narrow east bank of the Var River. The peaceful appearing stream nearly cost the lives of five men by its swift undercurrent. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0300 | | | After a 15 minute rest, the column moved down-stream some 600 yards to the so-called ford known to "Louie" and the I & R section guides. All personnel were instructed to take a last minute check of equipment and were told to form a human chain upon entering the water by holding to the back of the person's harness to their front. Individual arms were to be held out of water insofar as possible to assure their ability to function should the need arise in the immediate future. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | It had been decided to cross two columns each in single file to expedite the company reorganization on the eastern edge of the water, and the company was being so organized for the crossing. The water at this point was reported to be at low stage due to lack of rain, and 75 to 150 feet in width. The personnel of the company had been told to expect water to a depth of not more than three feet. | | ibid. |

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| 8/28/44 | | | | A reconnaissance and security patrol was sent across to determine the best crossing and secure the eastern edge of the water to allow the main body of the company to cross. The patrol crossed and by pointing chins to the sky managed to keep from drowning. The patrol leader sent two of the tallest of his patrol back to the Company C.O. to inform him of this fact. Coupled with this unexpected depth was the fact that the river at this point was flowing some five to six miles per hour, which was to be a dangerous undertaking for foot troops with no safety ropes. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The I & R section guides together with "Louie" were confronted with this fact and asked if there could possibly be a mistake in the location of the crossing site. Company C.O. was assured that this was the intended site, however it was found the I & R section, who had been charged with determining the depth, width, and velocity earlier in the evening, had failed to make a physical reconnaissance and had relied upon the word of the French FFI guide. "Louie", when asked specifically if he had actual personal knowledge of the crossing said he personally had never crossed at this particular spot but had been told by the FFI Commander of this area that it was shallow and easily fordable. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The men were informed of this development and instructed as to the depth, width, and velocity. Squad leaders were told to make certain that all short men would be behind a tall person in the crossing column. To guard against losing the heavier loaded weapons crews, two columns were to be used as before but the weapons group would now cross two to three yards upstream from the riflemen. This would give some protection to the crewmen should they lose their footing and be carried downstream by the swift current. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | Both columns entered the river and had advanced approximately three quarters of the distance across without mishap when a crew member of a 60 mm squad, carrying a tube and extra ammunition, lost his footing and was swept downstream. In an effort to save the man, the person next in the column had hung on to the man's harness and was jerked from his feet. In a like manner, the next three were jerked from their feet and carried downstream. Fortunately the riflemen, with a firm grip and not as heavily loaded, grabbed, or was grabbed, by a passing body. All persons were saved but individual weapons of four of the riflemen were lost in the stream. The column moved without further incident to the eastern edge of the water. Water soaked and gasping for breath the column moved some fifty feet east of the water and halted to reorganize. The security patrol leader reported that he had encountered no mines and that he had advanced some 100 yards to the east and had heard no sound that would indicate that the area was physically occupied or patrolled. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | "Louie" assured the commander that no German patrols were due to pass this general area for some 30 minutes. The column was quickly organized into the original single column for control, and prepared to move to the eastern bank of the river bed. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | This next checkpoint on the night movement was a large culvert some six to eight feet in diameter located some 200 to 300 yards to the east of the present position. This culvert allowed a small stream to flow under Highway 202 paralleling the Var River. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | Careful study of the terrain from the west bank during the daylight hours had indicated that this pipe was free of any wire or other man-made obstacles and, due to this, had been tentatively selected as a possible crossing into the enemy positions. Reconnaissance proved this to be false and other places of entry through the concertina and barbed wire had to be found. "Louie" vowed that though he had been wrong on the ford and the culvert, that he knew of a breach in the wire on the east bank. For the first time since the beginning of the operation the FFI produced positive intelligence. The breach proved to be clear of mines and completely through the wire barrier. | | ibid. |

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| 8/28/44 | | | | The column approached the gap and security elements were sent up and down the road to prevent enemy patrols from arriving at the time the column would be crossing the road. The FFI guide had assured the company commander that patrols were not due in this area for some time, but due to his wrong information on two previous occasions, it was felt that he could be wrong again. No noise was made as the column moved across the roadway and moved as rapidly as possible away from the roadway. The guide had chosen an evidently little-used trail through one of the small fields bordering the river. This was evidenced by the sticks, stones, and various other obstacles that caused the column to stumble and mutter as it proceeded to its objective. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | There was no evidence that the movement had been sensed or discovered by the enemy, as no shots or illuminating shells had been fired. The only noise in the night was an occasional spatter of artillery or mortar fire and the stuttering rip of a German M-42 and the answering heavy pounding of an American machine gun. From the noise it was apparent that the bridge was still an undecided issue. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | From this point to the ridge where the company would spent the day in hiding was strictly enemy territory. This particular section of terrain had been screened from view from the far bank and it was now up to "Louie," careful map study, and a great deal of prayer that someone would not kick a trip-flare and expose the maneuver to the enemy. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0330 | | | The company was still approximately one mile from the ridge and daylight at 0445. The FFI guide continued to lead off in the right direction with a supposed knowledge of the course he was following. After marching for some 20 uneventful minutes the Artillery Forward Observer, Captain James Lantz, remarked that a small wooden foot bridge the column was then crossing looked strangely familiar, and indeed it was. "Louie" had become lost and had wandered in a circle. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0350 | | | At this time the Command Group oriented themselves with the aid of a covered map and informed "Louie" that he was free to leave and complete his secondary mission of coordinating the FFI Forces in a harassing mission in the rear areas. Needless to relate, his services had not been appreciated. Guided by an azimuth and dead reckoning the column moved out for the ridge. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0420 | | | For some 30 minutes, the column wound upwards and at 0420 the head of the column could see the outline of the ridge top ahead. Patrols were dispatched to secure the area and the column moved into the selected area. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | With the fear of being exposed by the dawn, the platoons were hurriedly given an area among the boulders, last minute instructions were given on security and the long wait began. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 0445 | | | Dawn found the exhausted company securely nestled among the granite boulders on the ridge top and to all appearances in a position that was impenetrable except to heavy artillery concentrations or direct air strikes. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | With the coming of first light it was found that the town of La Roquette could be seen situated some 600 yards to the North and West, enthroned on the very top of an extension of the ridge line on which the company was located. A hog-back, or saddle, could be seen connecting the town's ridge top with that of the company's, fairly open, minus any large boulders, and offering an approach directly to the rear gate-way to the town. There was a difference of some 100 feet in elevation between the town and the company's location, which gave an additional advantage of being able to partially see into the interior of the town proper. | | ibid. |

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| 8/28/44 | | | | To the rear (east) of the position, at a range of some 2000 yards was another ridge line, slightly higher and extending as far as the eye could see. It was hoped that the enemy did not have this terrain occupied, as observation from this vantage point could permit a keen eye to notice an attack forming the coming afternoon. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | To the south was a canyon up which the company had advanced the night before. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | To the north was the hill mass overlooking the bridge. The enemy had this mass occupied in force and from the present position a fairly accurate location was made of some of the automatic weapons locations causing no and of trouble to the forces still on the west bank of the river. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | It was noticed that at least one large caliber mortar was firing from within the town. Although a portion of the town could be seen, the gun could not be accurately located but was marked down as a number one objective in the town. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | As yet no definite orders had been issued to the platoon leaders in regard to specific objectives within the town proper. Up until this time no plan had been formulated due to lack of knowledge of this interior of the walled town. The FFI guide "Louie" had provided a crude map of the town layout, but after his other mistakes, no one was willing to take anything that he had dealings with as gospel. Observation into the town from this vantage point revealed that the town was divided by two streets, each approximately 200 yards in length, with the stone houses side by side with no alley room. Width of the street appeared to be some 15 to 20 feet. Two gates led into the town one from the east and one from the north, each capable of passing an automobile. From this position visual reconnaissance was carried out down to the assault squad leaders, but was restricted in movement to prevent possible detection of movement by the enemy. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | Based on this visual reconnaissance, orders were issued to the company. Two platoons would be used in the assault. One platoon (-) would remain initially in reserve to the east of the town on the ridge and be prepared to enter the town and advance down either of the two streets. Weapons, both MG and mortar, would go into position in rear of the ridge and cover the advance of the assault platoons. Rally point would be in the town square. Each squad leader was informed that if his squad became lost or separated due to heavy fighting or darkness, that he would take one house, clear it, and remain until the company could extract his unit or direct it to the main body. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The second platoon was elected to be the right street unit and the third platoon would be the left. To each was attached two rocket launchers for breaching stone walls. First platoon, minus the road block squad, would be in support and would remain in position on the ridge. Due to the hour of the attack, it was felt that with the coming of darkness that the entire company would be brought into the section of town that had been cleared and would remain as a compact unit until the town was either captured, cleared, or the company forced to retire. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 1530 | | | At 1530, the radio silence, imposed for security reasons, was lifted. The artillery liaison officer, Captain James Lantz, was immediately occupied by directing very accurate artillery fire on the plotted automatic weapons position and other suspected enemy targets. The accuracy of this fire was evidenced by the fact that enemy could be seen moving away from the hill mass and a considerable lessening of the automatic weapons fire on the bridge site. Enemy movement of an estimated company strength was noticed some 1500 yards to the east moving in the direction of Levens. These were immediately taken under fire by the artillery, directed by the FO in the grandstand seat, as far as observation was concerned. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|---------|------|------|-------------|--|----------|---------|
| 8/28/44 | 1545 | | | At 1545 hours a reinforced squad, under the command of S/Sgt Craig, moved under cover along the east slope of the ridge to establish a road block on the Levens - La Roquette Highway. His orders were specific. He would establish a block, prevent any enemy from either entering or escaping the town of La Roquette. He would remain in this position until relieved or ordered to return to the company. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 1600 | | | At 1600, the company moved along the eastern slope of the ridge to a position in rear of the town. Machine guns and 60mm mortars were set up and prepared to cover the riflemen's advance to the gate in the town's wall. At this point it was discovered that two of the ammunition bearers for the machine guns had discarded half of their ammunition, (one box of 250 rounds, belted), their explanation being that during the night movement to the ridge they were just so tired that they couldn't carry it any longer. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | A last minute visual reconnaissance of the town now revealed that instead of two streets there appeared to be three. This last being more of an alleyway, between the wall and the rear of one row of buildings, than a street, but nevertheless being a thoroughfare that must be cleared. To this task the first platoon (-) was assigned, and a reserve was constituted from among the various ammunition bearers of the weapons sections. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 1625 | | | At 1625 hours the artillery preparation for the company attacking the bridge began and the leading elements of the Co. E platoons moved from under cover and advanced towards the town. Up until this time it is believed that the enemy was totally unaware that any force could possibly be in his rear areas, however at this time he took notice and began to fire on the advancing troops with small arms and mortar. Fortunately for the attacking force a large caliber mortar is not effective at a range of some 250 yards and little damage was done to the troops by the scattered small arms fire. The weapons crews on the ridge did not fare quite so well. A mortar round fell near one of the 60 mm mortar positions and seriously wounded one of the crewmen, but the weapons continued to fire to cover the advance. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | Under the cover of supporting fire, and by the use of marching fire, the assault platoons rushed into the gate of the town and sped toward their assigned streets. Muted rifle reports, the sharp reports of grenades, and the billow of WP smoke marked the beginning of the clearing of the houses. Excellent progress was made by assault platoons for the first few houses, but by this time the enemy had recovered from his surprise at being assaulted from the rear and had turned his attentions on the company. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The platoon advances began to slow, halted and carried on only by the sheer powers of leadership and profanity of the platoon leaders. However, a later investigation proved that the personnel of the platoons had not been to blame. In the case of both of the major assault platoons, no teams organized had been assigned for the house fighting that should have been an SOP order from the platoon leaders, (teams support each other from opposite sides of the street, one team clears a house, signals, and covers the advance of its sister team on the opposite side of the street). | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | Another obstacle was encountered in the fact that squads were not fully clearing the houses. In the case of the third platoon the clearing squads neglected to clear the upper story of some two or three houses with a result that the enemy dropped concussion grenades on the platoon leader and the support squad, causing several temporary casualties. Due to these neglected instructions the advance of the company was held up some 20 to 30 minutes while readjustments could be made. This time, of course, was used to good advantage by the enemy who succeeded in moving his scattered forces to a more centralized position in the town. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 8/28/44 | 1715 | | | The first platoon on the northern portion of the town had succeeded in clearing the houses along its street by 1715 hours and radioed the command group that it was now on the western end of the town with approximately 15 prisoners. It was instructed to hold fast and prepare to assist the advance of the remainder of the company if this could be done without firing into each other. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The weapons section was ordered into the town and displaced without incident to the east gate. Mortars were set up and told to be prepared to fire on order of the Company C.O. only. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The two major assault platoons, second and third, now radioed that their grenade supply was nearly depleted and asked for help in clearing the buildings. The only remaining fire power of the company was in the four light machine guns which were now out of action, and had displaced into the eastern edge of the town. This section, together with members of the 50 mm mortar squads was formed into a provisional platoon and given the mission of aiding the advance of the third (left) platoon. Machine guns were formed into two teams, two would work down each side of the street; the mortar crewmen and machine gun ammunition bearers, though armed with carbines, would be the assault riflemen and clear the houses after the machine guns had sprayed the inside. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | Upon arrival at the third platoon area it was found that the platoon leader was suffering from a slight concussion from a grenade dropped from an upstairs window, and the platoon well scattered through-out several houses, mostly ones that had been previously cleared. The provisional platoon moved forward, and by a series of literally spraying the doorway and windows with machine gun fire from a hip-held position, allowing the carbine carrying personnel to enter, that it was making a rather rapid advance. At this time the rifle platoon was reformed and with the combined force the attack swept swiftly along to the tune of numerous "kamerad" shouted from the enemy. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | 1830 | | | The enemy Company Commander, a captain, was captured at approximately 1830 and informed that he would send out the order for all of his personnel to surrender by 1900 or a systematic annihilation of those who refused would follow as the battalion closed into the area. This he did and by 1930 only those that were wounded or dead remained in the area. Radio contact was established with battalion and they were informed that the town was clear. The battalion ordered a contact patrol sent down the road to meet the advancing units who had succeeded in forcing their way across the. bridge with a minimum of casualties. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The attack on the town of La Roquette from the rear had caused what troops remaining on the hill mass east of the bridge to withdraw, as was later corroborated by PW reports. It was now dark and any movement outside the town to the east was immediately challenged. Although the German commander had stated that his force was to be the last to withdraw after destruction of the bridge, it wag felt that some enemy force might attempt a spite attack before withdrawing to the next defensive line. Reinforcements were sent to the road-block and the report was returned that the only action encountered had been a motorcycle that they had been forced to shoot to stop. Papers found in a dispatch case on the driver ordered the troops on the hill mass, east of the bridge, and the company in La Roquette to withdraw to Levens effective 2130 hours, after demolition of the bridge AT ALL COST. | | ibid. |
| 8/28/44 | | | | The 2nd Battalion passed through the Co. E road block at 2000 hours and occupied the hill mass east of the bridge against a possible return by the enemy and to protect the passage of the remainder of the regiment across the bridge the next day. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 8/28/44 | | | | In a summary of this operation, Co. E had succeeded in accomplishing its assigned mission and in so doing had allowed the battalion to secure an undestroyed bridge, which furthered, by some days, the Allied advance to the east. Had the company failed in this mission, casualties could have been extremely heavy in any attempts to secure the bridge by direct assault. The company and its attachments were complimented for a job well done by the Regimental Commander, Colonel Rupert D. Graves, and by the First Airborne Task Force commander, Major General Robert Fredrick. | | ibid. |
| | | | | Enemy losses were 25 killed and 81 captured in the town of La Roquette. Co. E losses were none killed, 10 wounded. | | ibid. |
| 8/27/44 | | 2nd Bn / 517 | | Date of attack on La Roquette not remembered. Only two wounded in E Company, both in my squad. We killed approximately 17 Germans and captured 77. | | Source: Gene Brissey's notes on Chronology's first draft |
| through 9/44 | | 517th PRCT | | defensive positions on Hill 1098 | South of Piera Cava | |
| 9/10/44 | | | | E Company approach to mountains overlooking Sospel. E Company held a position for 30 days, then moved to defensive position near Hill 1098 (Col de Braus). Held position for several days, then helped capture Sospel. Then moved to Maritime Alpes overlooking Italy. This was mid-November, including (Armistice, now) Veteran's Day. Sospel was cleared approximately 18 October 1944. | | Source: Gene Brissey's notes on Chronology's first draft |
| Sep. or Early Oct. | | 517th PRCT | | Siege on Sospel ends after 51 days. Liberated Sospel and established defensive positions to North and East of city | Sospel | |
| 11/17/44 | | 517th PRCT | | involvement in "Champagne Campaign" ends | | |
| | | 517th PRCT | Detached from 1st Airborne Task Force | Withdraws from front lines and via a 48 Km march moves to La Colle | La Colle | |
| 11/22/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Attached to XVIII Abn Corps | | |
| 6-Dec-44 or 7-Dec-44 | | 517th PRCT | | PRCT boards "40 and 8's" for trip to northern France (Soissons) | Antibes | |
| 12/10/44 | | 517th PRCT | XVIII Abn Corps (4) | detained | Soissons | |
| Night of 12/15/44 - 12/16/44 | | 517th PRCT | XVIII Abn Corps | Battle of the Bulge commences | | |
| 12/16/44 | | 517th PRCT | | detached from XVIII Abn Corps | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 12/16/44 or 12/17/44 | | | 7th Armored Division | Prior to the offensive, the 7th Armored Division which was in German, was suddenly moved at night to the critical roadbed of St. Vith. St. Vith is a critical road junction along the quickest route to Liege and other points which the Germans had in mind. | St. Vith | Source: The strategic capture of Hunnange by Task Force Seitz |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 12/17/44 to 12/23/44 | | | 7th Armored Division | The 7th Armored Division's stand at St. Vith Belgium from 17 to 23 December, 1944 had split Von Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive. Directed to withdraw from the St. Vith sector, the Division was immediately committed in the vicinity of Manhay, Belgium until relieved on 30 December 1944 | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 12/17/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Attached to 30th Inf Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 12/21/44 | 1100 | 517th PRCT | | Much of the PRCT travels through the afternoon and night on open "deuce-and-a-half" trucks | Travel to Belgium | |
| 12/21/44 | | | 7th Armored Division | After about three or four days of intense fighting, General Ridgeway ordered the 7th Armored Division to withdraw from St. Vith on the 21st of December for the purpose of shortening the lines and to consolidate the XVIII Airborne Corps back along the line of Malmedy - Ambleve. | Along a line from Malmedy to Ambleve | Source: The strategic capture of Hunnange by Task Force Seitz |
| 12/22/44 | A.M. after arrival | 2nd Bn | 30th Inf Div (5) | Except for periods they were actually attached to the 82nd Abn Div. or the 30th Inf Div. (both were part of XVIII Abn Corps) the 517th was moved throughout the XVIII Abn Corps area to defend against advancing Germans (acting much like Firemen, being sent wherever they were needed most) | | |
| 12/24/44 | | | Combat Command A (7th Armd Div) (- TF Seitz) | CO of CC"A" reported to 18th Corps as ordered early in morning of 24 Dec. 44. One company of 814th TD (Tank Destroyer) was alerted to have one platoon for movement by 0600 on 24 Dec 44 and this platoon was attached to CC "A" Task Force. CO CC"A" returned from Corps and issued verbal orders to have B Company, 40th Tank Battalion; A Company, 48th Armored Infantry Battalion; and, one platoon, A Company, 33rd Armored Engineer Battalion move to Manhay without delay. Entire command was to be moved into 550911 and 523930 troops to be dispersed there at once; remainder of command to follow at earliest possible time. Verbal orders from CO CC"A" were issued. All movement was affected and positions were taken up as shown on position overlay accompanying report #132. Contact was ained with 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne (possibly 325th Glider Infantry Regiment?). Contact was gained with 2nd Battalion 325 Airborne at Fraiture, Liaison with 591 FA (Field Artillery) was established at 1700. | map coordinates 550911 and 523930 | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| 12/24/44 | 1430 | CCA (7th Armored Div) | XVIII Abn Corps | The CC"A" sector was changed to include Tri-les-Cheslaing (5591) and the high ground west of Grandmenil-Vaux Chavanne (5290). Hq CC"A" was located at Manhay. | | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| 12/24/44 | 2230 | CCA (7th Armored Div) | XVIII Abn Corps | At about 2230 a severe hostile action was begun by the enemy after a heavy artillery concentration. Plans had been made for withdrawal of CC"A" unites to line Grandmenil - Vaux Chavanne as coordinated with adjacent units. The enemy attack was made almost simultaneously with this withdrawal. CC"A" units fell back and established a strongpoint at 537945. During the enemy attack, a German tank infiltrated through our lines and caused destruction of one half-track, one light tank, and two 1/4 ton trucks. Sever losses were inflicted on tank and infantry companies. | map coordinate 537945 | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| | | | | Lieutenant Colonel Seitz of the Second Battalion of the 517th Parachute Regiment (attached to CCA) was one of the best damned soldiers I have known, and I have known a hell of a lot of damned fine soldiers. He completed three very hairy missions for CCA with never a question or word or complaint. I note that I was correct in my judgment. During his subsequent promotions to four-star general (actually LTG) he commanded the XVIII Airborne Corps in which he served as a battalion commander when I observed him in the Ardennes. | | Source: A Colonel in the Armored Divisions, Wm. S. Triplet, p. 166 |
| 12/25/44 | | 517th PRCT | XVIII Abn Corps | | | |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 12/26/44 | morning | CCA (7th Armored Div) | XVIII Abn Corps | Enemy troops succeeded in re-entering Manhay the morning of 26 Dec 44. However, through this period, elements of CC"A" succeeded in maintaining and consolidating positions in sector assigned. Heavy concentration of artillery fire were directed against enemy positions in Manhay and beyond. | in/around Manhay | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| | | | | A document in Roy Landreth's files says the 1st Bn fought in Soy, Hotton, Freyneux, Dochamps, Manhay, Trois Ponts, Saint Jacques, Bergeval, Henumont, Coulee, Logbierme, Hochkreuz, Hunnange, Huertgen. He crossed out and inserted 2nd Bn had fought in Soy, Manhay, Trois Ponts, Saint Jacques, Bergeval, Hochkreuz, Hunnange | Some of the areas where 2nd Battalion fought were Soy, Manhay, Trois Ponts, Saint Jacques, Bergeval, Hochkreuz, Hunnange | |
| 12/26/44 | 1400 | 517th PRCT | | assigned to retake town | Manhay | |
| 12/27/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Detached from 30th Inf Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 12/27/44 | | CCA (7th Armored Div) | XVIII Abn Corps | Consolidation of positions continued. Two companies of the 517th Parachute Regt attacked and took the town of Manhay supported by Division Artillery. | | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| 12/28/44 | | CCA (7th Armored Div) | XVIII Abn Corps | No change in the situation took place. Positions were consolidated and forward listening posts were established which rendered hourly reports to Combat Command headquarters. Active patrolling was carried out and intermittent artillery fire from the enemy was reported from front line positions. | | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| 12/28/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Attached to 7th Armored Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 12/29/44 | | CCA (7th Armored Div) | XVIII Abn Corps | All positions were maintained and listening posts continued to render hourly reports to Combat Command headquarters. Active patrolling continued. | | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| 12/29/44 | | 517th PRCT | | Detached from 7th Armored | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 12/30/44 | | CCA (7th Armored Div) | XVIII Abn Corps | CC"A" was relieved in position on this date by elements of the 291st Infantry Regiment. CC"A" units completed movement to new assembly area in the vicinity of Xhoris. | Xhoris | Source: After Action Reports of Combat Command "A" of 7th Armored Division |
| 1/1/45 | | 517th PRCT | 82nd Airborne Division (6) | Attached to 82nd Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| Early January | | 7th Armored Division & 30th Infantry Division | XVIII Airborne Corps | When the allies commenced their counter-offensive in the early part of January, both the 7th Armored Division and the 30th Infantry Division were under the XVIII Airborne Corps. Both units were roughly positioned behind Werbomont and Stavelot. General Ridgway ordered the 7th Armored and 30th Infantry to attack to the southeast to capture St. Vith. | | Source: The strategic capture of Hunnange by Task Force Seitz |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| Early January | | 2nd Battalion 517th | XVIII Airborne Corps | I recall my battalion was in XVIII Airborne Corps Reserve, the Corps being commanded by General Ridgeway. | | Source: The strategic capture of Hunnange by Task Force Seitz |
| Early January | | 7th Armored Division | XVIII Airborne Corps | January 1945 opened with the 7th Armored Division as corps reserve of the XVIII Corps (Airborne) in an assembly area near Awaille, Belgium. | Awaille | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| Early January | | 7th Armored Division | XVIII Airborne Corps | January, 1945 opened with the 7th Armored Division as Corps reserve of the XVIII Corps (Airborne) in an assembly area near Aywaille, Belgium. The division order of battle was as follows....Combat Command "A" included the 17th Tank Battalion; 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion; and, B Company, 33rd Armored Engineer Battalion. | Aywaille | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| Early January | | 7th Armored Division | XVIII Airborne Corps | During the St. Vith operation and ensuing action at Manhay in December, the division had suffered heavy losses in both men and vehicles. Early in January. Reinforcements were received, trained and absorbed. New weapons were fired and new vehicles and equipment issued. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| Early January | | 7th Armored Division | XVIII Airborne Corps | Problems that confronted the division in the first part of January were the snow and cold that made roads slippery and very difficult to travel, and the lack of suitable billets in the area assigned to the division. To be within the Corps boundary, the division had to move all of its elements west of the Aywaille - Werbomont Road on 1 January. | Aywaille - Werbomont Rd. | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/1/45 | | 517th PRCT | 82nd Airborne Division | The 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, as of 1 January 1945, had its 2d and 3d Bns in an assembly area north of Trois Ponts Belgium. The 1st Bn was enroute from an action while attached to the 3rd Armored Division and probably would not be available on the morning of 3 January 1945. However the 1st Battalion was to be available to the regimental commander at approximately 1200 hours, 3 January 1945. | | Narrative of Captain Bill Smith, 551st PIB, while a student at the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Class 2, 1949-1950 |
| 1/2/45 | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The 3d Bn 517th Parachute Infantry was ordered to relieve the 504th Parachute Infantry on the night of 1-2 January 1945. On 2 January 1945, the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion was attached to the 517th Parachute Infantry for the attack commencing at 0830 on 03 January 1945. The regimental commander decided to attack with two battalions abreast: the 2d Bn on the left and the 551st on the right and the 3d Battalion in reserve, to assemble in rear of the 2d Battalion after passage of the lines at 0830 on 03 January 1945. | | ibid. |
| 1/2/45 | | 551st PIB | | The Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division ordered the Regimental Commander of the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment to relieve the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment during the night of 1-2 January 1945, and to attack south and southeast at 0830 on 03 January 1945 from its positions and secure the Salm River line from Trois Ponts Belgium to Grand Halleux. | Salm River line from Trois Ponts to Grand Halleux | ibid. |
| 1/3/45 | | | | On 03 January 1945 a new boundary for XVIII Abn Corps was established and the 7th Armored Div including CCA (see 1/11/45) moved its elements that had been positioned south of Werbomont-Hamoir Rd to the north of that road. | | ibid. |
| 1/3/45 | 0830 | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The attack was ordered for 0830 on 03 January 1945 and the general plan of the Army was as follows: the XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of the 30th Infantry Division, the 75th Infantry Division, the 106th Infantry Division (-), and the 82nd Airborne Division, would attack south and southeast, secure the Salm River line and the town of Vielsalm, Belgium. The VII Corps was to attack south through the gap opened by the XVIII Airborne Corps and link up with the Third Army in the vicinity of Houffalize Belgium. | Salm River line and the town of Vielsalm | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The XVIII Airborne Corps assigned the mission of seizing and securing the Salm River line and the town of Vielsalm to the 82nd Airborne Division. The Division, in turn, planned to attack south and southeast at 0830 on 3 January 1945 with three regiments abreast: the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 325th Gilder Infantry Regiment in that order from left to right. The 505th Parachute Infantry and the 508th Parachute Infantry were to be initially in division reserve. The line of contact was to be the line of departure. Contact was to be from left to right. | | ibid. |
| 1/3/45 | | 2nd Bn | 517th PRCT | 2nd Bn. was assigned to attack and seize Trois Ponts and Monte Fosse. D Co. and E Co. were the lead companies and F Co. was in reserve. They passed through a battalion of the 82nd that had been in defensive positions for 5 or 6 days. Attack was very costly. 20 KIA and 90 WIA. Trois Ponts was the northern shoulder of the salient known as "The Bulge." | South along Salm River to Trois Ponts and Monte Fosse | |
| | | E Company | 2nd Battalion / 517th PRCT | Trois Ponts and Mont Fosse were costly for E Company which attacked Mont de Fosse on 3 January and was blasted. Got help and moved through area before returning to Trois Ponts and had a break before moving on into Battle of the Bulge. E Company was deeply involved through the woods to Hunnange. | | Sounrce: Gene Brissey's notes on Chronology's first draft |
| 1/2/45 | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | <i>The following covers operations of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion over the period 2-4 January 1945. During that time, the 551st was attached to the 517th and manned the 517th's right flank during the attacks mentioned below. This material is substantially taken from Captain Bill Smith's paper presented to the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Class No 2, 1949-1950.</i> | | |
| 1/2/45 | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The weather on 2 January 1945 was foggy, heavily overcast and cold (below freezing night and day). There was a blanket of snow on the ground about twelve inches deep and frozen almost solid. Because of the fog visibility was limited to between one hundred and two hundred yards in the low areas while the high ground was completely obliterated. Observation was limited to the present line of contact and about 200 hundred yards beyond. | | Narrative of Captain Bill Smith, 551st PIB, while a student at the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Class 2, 1949-1950 |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment attacks at 0830 on 03 January 1945 and secures the Salm River line from Trois Ponts to Grand Halleux. The 2d Battalion on the left and the 551st Parachute Battalion on the right. | Salm River line from Trois Ponts to Grand Halleux | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | 551st Parachute Infantry Bn will attack at 0830 on 03 January 1945 along the axis St. Jacques - Dairomont - Petit Halleux and secure the crossings of the Salm River in the vicinity of Grand Halleux, Company A on the left, Company C on the right, and Company B in reserve. Line of Departure is present line of contact. | along an axis of St. Jacques - Dairomont - Petit Halleux | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The battalion aid station was to open at 0830 on 03 January 1945 at Basse Bodeux. Squad rolls will be placed in company areas and picked up in that area by the S-4 tomorrow. Men will not wear overcoats or overshoes. One-third of a K ration and the SOP amount of ammunition will be issued in this area prior to the movement as it is impossible to get vehicles into the forward assembly area. | Basse Bodeux | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | After receiving the order there was approximately one hour of daylight left (the order was finished at approximately 1600) in which to execute a hurried reconnaissance and issue the company attack order. It was necessary to give the platoon leaders time to plan for their actions on the following day. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The terrain was generally heavily wooded with ridge lines running in a north-south direction. The elevation of the ridge lines was from 100-500 meters. Small streams followed the low ground between the ridges but they, in themselves, did not constitute obstacles. The road net running east-west was generally good but the one running north-south was generally poor. Wheeled vehicles were pretty much restricted to the existing roads due to the forests and the snow, The terrain sloped gently down toward the line of departure and was open and smooth from the forward assembly area to the line of departure. From the line of departure to the initial objectives the terrain sloped gently upward and was open. The initial objectives were wooded high points approximately 800 yards from the line of departure. | | ibid. |
| 1/2/45 | 1830 | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The company attack order was given at approximately 1830 on 02 January 1945 and due to the group reconnaissance earlier it was very brief. At approximately 1845 the platoon leaders began to orient their men and issue their own attack orders. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | At 0430 on 03 January, the battalion moved out of its rear assembly area and began its march to the forward assembly area. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The final assembly area was reached at 0815 and the companies quickly deployed, made their final checks and moved toward the line of departure at 0845. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | On the left Company A was met with intense artillery and small arms fire the moment it crossed the line of departure. Most of the small arms fire was coming from the zone of the 2d Bn of the 517th on their left. Tanks were observed in the vicinity of Mont De Fosse and their fire was added to the weight of the German fires directed at this company. By moving aggressively the company advanced in spite of this fire to a position about 100 yards from the woods where it was stopped by fire from its front. At this time the company was being hit by extremely accurate fires from its left flank, from the vicinity of Mont De Fosse and fire from its front, from the edge of the woods. The company had suffered about 20 casualties including the company commander and one platoon leader . | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | By 1100 hours Company C had captured its initial objective and was preparing to continue the attack southwest down the ridge toward Fosse and to seize the road running from Fosse to St. Jacques. Contact between Company A and Company C had been lost at about 1130 hours and had not been reestablished. Every effort to send patrols toward the A Company zone were blocked by Germans in positions along the creek running northeast through the battalion zone. | Road running from Fosse to St. Jacques | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | Company A, by employing artillery on the Germans in the vicinity of Mont De Fosse (this fire had to be cleared with the 2d Battalion of the 517th) and mortars on the Germans to their front, had managed to advance into the woods. Within the woods this advance was slow and bitterly contested every foot of the way. The company executive officer, who had taken over the company when the company commander had been wounded, Lt. Booth, had committed his support platoon just prior to entering the woods. The company advanced with three platoons abreast with their right flank generally along the creek. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | This slow advance continued until the company reached the near edge of objective ONE. There the company halted momentarily and attempted to assault the German positions. After a sharp hand to hand engagement the company was thrown back and quickly counterattacked. This counterattack came at about 1300 and was supported by two German tanks. After more severe fighting the company was forced back to the edge of the woods. There it dug in and remained for the balance of the day. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | Contact between Company A and the 2d Battalion on its left had never been made and with Company C on its right had never been regained. The company commander had, although, been in contact with the battalion commander by radio all day long. Company A had suffered approximately 50 casualties during the day due mainly to the lack of contact with the 2d Battalion on their left. Even after being driven back from their objective they continued to receive fire from the vicinity Mont De Fosse until darkness. Two small counterattacks from the left were also repulsed during the late afternoon. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | At approximately 1300 hours the battalion commander notified the regimental commander of his situation and his plan to commit the reserve company. The regimental commander concurred in this decision and notified the battalion commander that he would do something to take the pressure off his left flank. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | In the zone of the 2d Battalion, 517th, a very bitterly contested fight for the town of Trois Ponts was shaping up. The entire battalion had been stopped immediately in front of the line of departure by a tremendous fire from the vicinity of Trois Ponts, Mont De Fosse and the high ground between the two towns, consequently a gap of about 2000 yards existed between this 2nd battalion and Company A. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | At approximately 1800 hours the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion Command Post received a message from the regimental commander outlining the plan of action for the night of 3-4 January. To complicate things snow began to fall at about 1830 hours . | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The regimental commander had ordered the 1st Battalion of the 517 to move through the zone of the 551st, attack east, capture St. Jacques, Bergeval, and the high ground south of Mont De Fosse, and establish and maintain contact with the 551st on their right and the 2d Battalion on their left (this would plug the 2000 yard gap mentioned earlier). | St. Jacques - Bergeval and the high ground south of Mont de Fosse | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | At approximately 2200 on 03 January the 1st Battalion of the 517th had cleared our zone and launched their attack. By daylight they had captured the objectives assigned to them. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | At approximately 2230 on 03 January, after the 1st Battalion cleared our zone, the battalion commander ordered the movement to begin. Contact with the enemy was broken and the companies moved out. Snow fell most of the night making visibility almost an impossibility. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The movement was slow and halting but at about 0230 on 04 January the 551st was in position for the attack. | | ibid. |
| | | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The weather cleared during the night of 4-5 January and by midnight a full moon was out, which combined with the snow made the night almost brilliant. The temperature went down to slightly below zero which added to the discomfort of the men. | | ibid. |
| 1/5/45 | 0900 | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | At about 0900 hours the regimental commander had visited the battalion. He informed the battalion commander that the 1st and 2d Battalions had occupied the high ground west of the Salm River in their zones during the previous night.. | | ibid. |
| 1/5/45 | 1500 | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | The battalion situation as of 1500 hours was as follows: Companies B and C, each with one section of machine guns attached, were in position on the high ground west of RochelINVAL. Company A was in battalion reserve in an area behind Company B, the Battalion Command Post as indicated on Map G and the 81mm mortar platoon, in position just east of Dairomont. | RochelINVAL | ibid. |
| | 1500 | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | At approximately 1500 hours the Headquarters Company Commander was ordered to blow the bridge over the Salm River just south of RochelINVAL sometime during the night of 5-6 January, It was hoped that by accomplishing this the Germans in the vicinity of RochelINVAL would be unable to reinforce their positions in front of the battalion with additional armor from east of the river. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 1/5/45 | 0900 | 551st PIB | 517th PRCT | Around 0900 a German counterattack in an estimated company strength supported by mortars, nebelwerfer, and some artillery struck Company B. Company B however was aware that the attack was coming, as a local security outpost reported it, and heavy artillery and mortar barrages were placed on the advancing Germans. The counterattack was broken up before It reached the lines of Company B and the Germans withdrew. Considerable nebelwerfer fire continued to fall on the positions of the two front line companies during the remainder of the morning. Aside from a direct hit on the battalion message center at about 1200 on 06 January by a nebelwerfer salvo, which destroyed considerable Christmas mail and packages, the day was relatively quiet. | | ibid. |
| 1/5/45 | 1400 | | 504th | At about 1400 hours the battalion was detached from the 517th and attached to the 504th. The battalion was to remain in place, its zone was not changed except that the battalion left boundary became the regimental left boundary. | | ibid. |
| 1/5/45 - 1/11/45 | | | | | | |
| 1/11/45 | | 517th PRCT | 82nd Abn Div | Detached from 82nd Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 1/11/45 | 0900 | 2nd Bn | CCA (7th Armd Div) (7) | 2nd Battalion, 517th Parachute Regimental Combat Team attached to Combat Command A, which included elements of 7th Armored Division (17th Tank Bn; 23rd Armored Inf Bn; B Co. 33rd Armored Engr Bn). The 7th Armored Division's order of battle states 2/517 was attached to CCA from January 11-27, 1945. | moved from Goronne to Neuville then to Polleux. | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 Corroborating Source: The strategic capture of Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| 1/11/45 | | Task Force Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | TF Seitz formed. The TF includes 2nd Battalion 517th PIR; B Co., 17th Tank Battalion; 3rd platoon, A Co. 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion; and, 3rd platoon, B Co., 33rd Armored Engineer Battalion. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| | | | 7th Armored Division | 7th Armored Division begins a two day one night march by infiltration over two routes to an assembly area in the vicinity of Verviers-Spa. | Verviers - Spa (Need to confirm that CCA/TF Seitz went with them...) | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/11/45 | | Task Force Seitz | | About this time, the 11th of January, the 2nd Battalion of the 517th was detached from the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment and attached to CCA of the 7th Armored Division. The CCA was commanded by Col. Triplet, who was a tall large man with a lot of armor and combat experience. I felt Triplet was truly an outstanding leader as wll as a great human being. Col Triplet then told me, "Seitz, my crystal ball tells me that this Auf der Hardt woods is an infantry job, and I want you to take Auf der Hardt woods." | | Source: The Strategic Capture of Hunnange by Task Force Seitz. Narrative by R.H. Seitz, LTG ret'd US Army |
| 1/11/45 | | Task Force Seitz | | At the time, I had moved the entire task force to an assembly position in a wooded area near Am Kreuz. Auf der Hardt woods dominated the entire area, including Born, which was the objective of Task Force Wemble n addition to Diedenberg which they recently captured, then then released me to make my attack. | Wooded area near Am Kreuz, Auf der Hardt woods, Born | Source: The Strategic Capture of Hunnange by Task Force Seitz. Narrative by R.H. Seitz, LTG ret'd US Army |
| 1/11/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | awaiting XVIII Abn Corps orders to attack St. Vith | | |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 1/11/45 | 2000 | | XVIII Airborne Corps | Field Order # 2 directs Corps to attack at 0800 on 13 January 1945 to secure a line La Neuville to Houvegnez to Waimes. Once that line was secured, the attack was to be continued to seize and secure St. Vith and the high ground along the general line from Beho to Maldange to St. Vith to Ambleve. 7th Armored Division was to remain in its assembly area and attack on Corps order. The division's mission was to "pass rapidly through 1st Infantry Division in zone of action; attack and destroy enemy wherever found in St. Vith area; destroy his road traffic; seize St. Vith; and on further Corps order, organize and defend this road center; reconnoiter south and east of St. Vith; protect Corps east flank. | Line from La Neuville to Houvegnez on to St. Vith along the general line from Beho to Maldange | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/11/45 | | 517th PRCT (-2 Bn) | | Attached to 106th Inf Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 1/13/45 | | 517th PRCT (-2 Bn) | | <i>from website of Orders of Battle</i> | Near Heunemont, Belgium | |
| 1/13/45 | | 517th PRCT | | attacked Henumont | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 1/13/45 | | 2nd Battalion | CCA (7th Armd Div) | The 517th's 2nd Battalion, along with 7th Armored Division completes movement to the new assembly area near Verviers-Spa. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/14/45 - 1/19/45 | | 2nd Battalion | CCA (7th Armd Div) | 7th Armored Division remained in Corps reserve and completed final preparations for its attack. 1500 white mattress covers were issued to the units as snow camouflage on 14 January. 125 snow capes were also received and distributed. On 20 January, 1500 additional two-piece white camouflage suits were issued to bring the total disbursement to an amount sufficient to equip each line infantryman with a mattress cover or camouflage suit, and in addition key personnel of tank battalions, artillery battalions, the Engineer battalion and the Calvary Reconnaissance Squadron were equipped. | | ibid. |
| 1/17/45 | | 517th PRCT (-2 Bn) | | Detached from 106th Inf. Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 1/18/45 | | | 7th Armored Division | Boundary between the 30th Inf. Div. and the 7th Armored Div. was changed by XVIII Abn Corps due to slow progress of other attacking units. The change in boundary removed the St. Vith portion of the division's objective when they extended from the high ground north of St. Vith to the north and east to Ambleve. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/19/45 | | | 7th Armored Division | Division CP moves to Waimes and Combat Command A and Combat Command B move into final attack positions, closing in on assembly areas in the vicinity of Waimes during the night of 19-20 January. A combination of hilly terrain, snow, and ice made the movement difficult. | Waimes | ibid. |
| 1/20/45 | | 517th PRCT (-2 Bn) | 30th Inf Div | PRCT detached from 30th Infantry Division. | | |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 1/20/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Under the command of Col. William S. Triplet, CC"A" divided into three Task Forces. Task Force Wemple led by Lt. Col John C. Wemple of the 17th Tank Battalion; Task Force Rhea led by Lt. Col Robert L. Rhea, CO of the 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion; and Task Force Seitz, under Lt. Col. Richard H. Seitz of the 2nd Battalion 517 Parachute Infantry Regiment, went into the attack on the morning of 20 January 1945 with their immediate objectives being Diedenberg, the high ground southeast of Diedenberg and the clearing of the Auf der Hardt woods. Task Force Wemple obtained its objective by 1030 meeting only light resistance. Task Force Rhea succeeded in securing the high ground southeast of Diedenberg by 1530 despite heavy enemy resistance from houses in their zone of action. During the remainder of the period positions were consolidated and plans made for the attack on 21 January of the Auf der Hardt woods. | Diedenberg, high ground southeast of Diedenberg, Auf der Hardt woods. | Source: After Action Report, Combat Command "A" of the 7th Armored Division |
| 1/20/45 | 0730 | Combat Command A | 7th Armored Division | 7th Armored Division begins its attack south through the sector held by the 1st and 30th Infantry Divisions. The day was cold with snow falling. The immediate object of CCA was the village of Deidenberg. | Deidenberg | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/20/45 | 0930 | Combat Command A | 7th Armored Division | TF Wemple attacked the village from the north and northeast at 0930, and as enemy resistance was light had taken in by 1030. | Deidenberg | ibid. |
| 1/20/45 | ?? | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | 2nd Bn. Command Post (CP) moves from Walk to Am Kreuz | Am Kreuz | |
| 1/20/45 | | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | TF Rhea passed through TF Wemple and by 1530 secured the high ground to the southeast of the village despite heavy small arms fire from houses in the zone. | Deidenberg | ibid. |
| 1/20/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | In preparation for attack to seize the high ground of Auf der Hardt woods. TF Seitz moves to an assembly position in a wooded area near Am Kreuz. The Auf der Hardt woods dominates the entire area including Born which was the objective of TF Wemple. | Near Am Kreuz | Source: The strategic attack on Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| 1/20/45 | 2325 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | In the fall of snow flurries and continued cold weather, the elements of CCA continued to advance on 21 January. TF Seitz took the high ground to the south of Deidenberg meeting moderate enemy existence in the form of small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. TF Rhea moved east to secure a more advantageous defensive position to the south of Eibertingen. The 508th RCT began moving into the area as planned and upon detrucking attached to the 7th Armored Division and CCA at 1530. It relieved the CCA task forces by 2325 and assumed the defense of the Deidenberg - Eibertingen region. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/20/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | The CCA Commanding Officer, Col. Triplet, had told LTC Seitz he could attack at any time he wanted to. After making a daylight reconnaissance with his S3, Seitz decided he would attack during the hours of darkness. This is because of the long expanse of open terrain, about a mile and a quarter to the objective and the very deep snow. | | Source: The strategic attack on Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| 1/20/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | My plan was to attack with two companies abreast, E Co. on the right and D Co. on the left, with F Co. in reserve. I planned no initial supporting artillery or mortar fire for the attack, but I did have specific artillery fire pre-planned for certain spots on call. I instructed the TD platoon I had on hand to hold and remain silent until I observed the outpost by Auf der Hardt Woods. On my order they were to close rapidly on the woods and I estimated this to be the beginning morning nautical twilight. My attack really depended a lot on surprise on what was considered a sole enemy outpost on the forward edge of the woods I also hoped to surprise the main German force which I had knowledge were also pretty well bunkered up. | | Source: The strategic attack on Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| 1/21/45 | | E Co. | CCA (7th Armd Div) | E Co. was in the Auf der Hardt woods and that the Company attacked the woods at 0400. On 1/22/45 they were "still in the woods" (possibly referring to the next objective, the der Eidt woods) and on 1/23/45, they were in Hunnange. | | Source: 48 Hours in the Life of the 2nd Bn, 517th PIR |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 1/21/45 | | E Co. | CCA (7th Armd Div) | E Company strength listed at 5 Officers and 100 EM | | |
| 1/21/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | | The distance from the wooded area South of Am Kreuz to the Auf der Hardt Woods is approximately 1.25 miles of open terrain. Hochkreuz is 0.75 miles South of the Auf der Hardt woods. | |
| | | | | <i>It appears there is a discrepancy of one day between the 7th Armored's after action report, Combat Command "A's" After Action Report, the 517th's morning reports and Gen Seitz's narrative of the attack on Hunnange.</i> | | |
| 1/21/45 | 0400 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 0400 21 January 1945 Task Force Seitz moved out across the LD (line of departure) toward their objective, the Auf der Hardt woods. Very little opposition was met and by 0900 Task Force Seitz was on the objective. Task Force Wemple and Task Force Rhea moved out from their positions at 0800 to tie in with the flanks of Task Force Seitz. By 1200 this was accomplished and a small force was then ordered to seize the high ground at 879964, which mission was accomplished at 1400. | map grid 879964 | Source: After Action Report, Combat Command "A", 7th Armored Division |
| 1/21/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Task Force Seitz, in advancing to clear the Auf der Hardt woods met moderate enemy resistance, consisting of the main of small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. Five members of an enemy patrol captured in the are of Task Force Seitz's advance brought to light the fact that units of the 12th SS Panzer Division were defending against CC"A's" advance. <i>(note: 12th SS Panzer Division was Hilter's elite youth military group)</i> Artillery and nebelwerfer fire was used by the enemy in considerably heavy concentrations on this date in the area of Auf der Hardt woods. | Auf der Hardt woods. | ibid. |
| 1/21/45 | 0400 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Nautical Twilight is when the center of the Sun is > 6° but < 12° below the horizon. At this time, sailors can take reliable sights of stars, using a visible horizon for reference. The end of this pd. is also the time when traces of light near the sunset or sunrise point of the horizon are very difficult to discern (often referred to as "first light" before civil dawn). At BMNT (nautical dawn) under good atmospheric conditions and in the absence of other light, outlines of objects may be distinguishable, but details are not recognizable, and the horizon is indistinct. Nautical twilight has military considerations as well. BMNT (begin morning nautical twilight) and EENT (end evening NT) are considered when planning military operations. A unit may treat them with heightened security, due to tactics dating back to the French and Indian War, when both sides would use BMNT and EENT to launch attacks. | | |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 1/21/45 | 0400 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | The weather was cold as hell and it was snowing, in some places it was up to the soldiers' waists and in general it was above the knees. We jumped off at four o'clock in the morning. Prior to the attack, I estimated that if we had no problems it would take us two and a half to three hours to get to our objective. The fact it was snowing reduced the visibility considerably, but I felt afterward that this helped screen my preparatory movements as well as my movements during the attack. The attack was slow and difficult through the deep snow. As the attack unfolded, the one thing that worried me were communications and control of the unit due to the lack of visibility. | | The Strategic Attack on Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| | | | | I appreciated the fact that the falling snow more or less screened our movement from the Germans. We made a special effort to have connecting skirmish lines, side by side, to maintain contact because I wanted to maintain radio silence as well as all other silence. The troops were pretty loaded down with ammunition, although I had told them to leave all overcoats behind because I thought the overcoats would impede their movement through the deep snow plus they would be sweating a lot moving for two to three hours. | | ibid. |
| 1/21/45 | 0800 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Just about the beginning of BMNT, which was about 8 o'clock, we surprised the outpost, and captured its defenders. The Germans had been in the area for a considerable time and they had lots of bunkers, which later on in the day would give us considerable trouble. During the attack our people killed several Germans, wounded about 30, and took about 16 or 17 prisoners. Meanwhile, the tanks closed up and passed through the woods, according to the plan. The Germans were completely surprised, although the Germans fought stubbornly, and D Company, as I recall, had a lot of trouble clearing out the Germans in their sector. During the melee, there was a lot of sniping and the commander of E Company estimated that he had killed 40 or 50 Germans. | | ibid. |
| | 0800 | | | Task Force Wemple and Task Force Rhea moved out from their positions at 0800 to tie in with the flanks of Task Force Seitz. By 1200 this was accomplished and a small force was then ordered to seize the high ground at 879964, which mission was accomplished at 1400. | map grid 879964 | Source: After Action Report, Combat Command "A", 7th Armored Division |
| | 0900 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Very little opposition was met and by 0900 Task Force Seitz was on the objective. | Auf der Hardt woods. | ibid. |
| 1/21/45 | mid-morning probably before 1000 | | | According to LTG Seitz, SSGT David T. Hines is KIA after being shot by a sniper. Roy Landreth said he watched Hines die of a neck wound as he drowned in his own blood. | | From an email from Gen. Seitz and conversation with Roy Landreth |
| 1/21/45 | 1000 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | By about 10 o'clock I was confident that we had the objective in hand. Prior to the attack, I asked the D Company commander to send out a combat patrol to the southwest of the objective to the village of Hockkreuz which was 3/4 of a mile south of the woods. There was a important road that ran from the river up north to St. Vith. I thought we could expect a counter attack from that area. The counterattack never materialized but the patrol captured a Mark IV tank and the crew. The patrol then moved to another small town, I don't recall the name, which was along that road. There they ran into problems, they did not surprise the Germans and some of our TD's were ambushed and destroyed by German self-propelled guns. | | The Strategic Attack on Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| 1/21/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At this time I got word from CCA that taking Born was proving to be more difficult than anticipated, and there was also a rumor that the Peiper Group was holding Born. As you recall, they were the infamous force that massacred American Prisoners at Malmedy. | Born | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
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| 1/22/45 | 0000 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Around midnight, Col. Triplet, CO of CCA orders TF Seitz to attack another wooded area, Der Eidt Woods, about 1 mile north of Hunnange. Triplet, gives Seitz vehicles, Seitz assigned D Co to ride on tanks and E and F Co's on half-tracks. Tanks make it easily to the wood, while E and F Cos tracks don't work well and they dismount to cover the last two miles on foot. | Der Eidt Woods | Source: After Action Report, Combat Command "A", 7th Armored Division |
| 1/22/45 | 0200 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | The Command Officer of Combat Command "A" issued operations instructions to assembled Task Force Commanders at a meeting at the CC"A" CP at 0200 22 January 1945. These operations instructions set for the plan for taking Hunnange and the wooded area east of Hunnange. | | ibid. |
| 1/22/45 | Mid-morning | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | We started at midnight and mid-way through the next morning were in that woods with no great opposition except some mortar fire and artillery fire. The woods provided the assembly area for our attack on Hunnange. Triplet gave us the mission of attacking Hunnange which was a key terrain and road net. The capture of Hunnange ensured the capture of St. Vith. | | The Strategic Attack on Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| 1/22/45 | 0930 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Combat Command Reserve which had been in division reserve, occupied and assumed the responsibility of the defensive positions held by CCA. The relief of CCA was completed by 0930. Combat Command A, after being relieved was to attack south and seize Hunningen and the wooded area to the east of Hunningen. | Hunningen | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/22/45 | 1000 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Task Force Seitz and TF Wemple jumped off at 1000 and rapidly pushed south in the face of moderate resistance in the form of small arms and anti-tank fire. The speedy advance disorganized the enemy, little artillery fire was received, and no contact with armor was reported, the enemy infantry bearing the brunt of the attack. | | ibid. |
| 1/22/45 | 1000 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 1000 on 22 January 1945, the movement for the attack began and, moving through small arms, anti-tank, and artillery fire, Task Forces Seitz and Wemple put themselves in position to jump off and take Hunnange. . | | Source: After Action Report, Combat Command "A", 7th Armored Division |
| 1/22/45 | Mid-day | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | We spent most of mid-day in those woods, so I had plenty of time to conduct reconnaissance and formulate my plan. I wanted to attack at noon rather than waiting until the next day and Triplet gave me the ok. I was very proud of this attack, I put D Company on tanks again, F Company on foot and E Company in reserve, and I decided to attack at 1700 at the beginning of evening nautical twilight. | | The Strategic Attack on Hunnange by TF Seitz |
| 1/22/45 | | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 1700 both Task Forces jumped-off and by 1745 had reached their objective and were consolidating positions. Task Force Rhea, in the meantime, had take up positions on the south edge of the In der Eidt Woods, having followed Task Forces Seitz and Wemple, mopping up such resistance as remained behind those task forces. Small arms fire and anti-tank fire was met by our advancing troops but was swiftly reduced. Speed of advance was the "order of the day" for our troops and in carrying this out they succeeded in disorganizing the enemy to a large extent. A few enemy tanks were observed but these did not engage in ground fighting except for firing at long range. | | Source: After Action Report, Combat Command "A", 7th Armored Division |
| 1/22/45 | | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Enemy units efforting to oppose our advance this date were revealed through PW interrogation to be elements of the 18 VG Div (Volksgrenadier division), the 246 VG Div, and the 12 SS Pz Div. Artillery fire was not in as great amount as on the previous day and the enemy infantry bore the brunt of defense without much support. The result was the capture intact of several isolated enemy groups of resistance. Upon reaching its objective CC "A" assumed control of Task Force Griffin commanded by Lt Col Griffin, CO of the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|---------|------|----------|--------------------|---|---|---|
| 1/22/45 | 1700 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 1700 hours, 22 January 1945, the attack jumped off. This force dashed across this open terrain with a devastating output of fire power. All tanks were firing, and all men were firing their individual weapons. As the tanks reached approximately the center of the field between the line of departure and their objective, they began to receive heavy assault gun fire from Neider-Emmels, Belgium (838908). This town was reported to have been taken before the attack of Task Force Seitz jumped off. It was later discovered that only the northwest portion had been taken. Part of the tanks immediately changed direction and attacked toward Neider-Emmels Belgium (838908). Both the towns of Neider-Emmels Belgium (838908) and Hunnange Belgium (844899) soon became flaming wrecks. | Neider-Emmels (838908), Hunnange (844899) | Source: From Roy Landreth's files. A page that seems part of a larger report, this section titled "Ardennes 517/2" and "Covers combat operations of second battalion during the period 22-27 January 1945. From an after action report prepared by the 7th Armored Div. covering operations of Task Force Seitz during the battle for St. Vith" |
| 1/22/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Company "?" on foot, in the face of heavy small arms fire and automatic weapons fire, pressed on across the open field of snow toward Hunnange Belgium (844899). Company D rode on tanks into the towns and soon thereafter Company F entered. The sudden attack and heavy fire completely demoralized the enemy. However, many small groups of the enemy had sought refuge in the cellars of the town from the assault fire of the attacking force. Here either crazed by fear or for fanatical reasons, they fought like "cornered rats." The troops of the Task Force also seemed to have become imbued with an additional battle spirit, so with fierce determination, they wiped out these pockets with grenades and small arms. | | Source: Files of Roy Landreth |
| 1/22/45 | 1700 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | TF Seitz set to overrun Neider Emmels and Hunnange | Neider Emmels | |
| 1/22/45 | | 2nd Bn | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Launch attack on Hunnange. Receive heavy fire from Eider-Emmels. Previously reported as captured. Company D (riding on tanks) and Company F (on foot) attack across an open field. Capture Hunnange. 149 Prisoners/7 Mark IV's. Establish defensive positions. Set up road block near Lorentswaldchen. 2nd Bn's capture of Hunnange assured success of Combat Command B's attack on St. Vith. | Nider-Emmels, Lorentswaldchen | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 1/22/45 | 1700 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | With D Co. on tanks, F Co. on foot and E Co. in reserve the attack on Hunnange commences across open terrain of 600-700 yards. | | |
| 1/22/45 | 1745 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | TF Seitz and TF Wemple reached the objective at 1745 and by 1900 the combined forces had ended all enemy resistance there. TF Rhea followed, TF Seitz and TF Wemple, mopping up pockets of resistance that had been isolated in the rapid advance and took up positions along the southern edge of the In der Eidt woods, northeast of Hunningen. The division now controlled the high ground overlooking the pile of rubble that once had been St. Vith, only 2,000 yards away. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/22/45 | 2000 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | With the fighting in Hunnange almost over, a strong combat patrol from E Co. is sent down the main highway towards St. Vith with orders to hold up about 3/4 mile short of town, and establish a defensive position. | | |
| 1/22/45 | 2100 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | By 2100 hours, 22 January 1945, organized resistance had ceased and the town was secured. The results of this attack was 149 prisoners taken, seven Mark IV assault guns knocked out, a division radio vehicle captured intact with personnel, and an estimated 100 killed. Deep snow and burning buildings prevented an accurate account of the number killed or damage done. | | Source: Files of Roy Landreth |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|----------------|------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--|--|--|
| 1/22/45 | 2100 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Though impossible of description by words, the macabre picture of war's destruction presented by this village is some indication of the damage dealt the enemy in this attack. In the half light of dusk, flaming buildings and enemy armored vehicles filled the air with the stench of burning bodies and lit the gruesome scene with a weird flickering light by which could be seen the scattered wreckage of war. Numerous dead and wounded lay in grotesque postures amid the litter of machine guns, broken weapons, individual equipment, and gory remnants of human beings. | | ibid. |
| 1/22/45 | 2100 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Through this could be heard the sound of bursting grenades, the crack of a rifle, the rattle of a tommy-gun, interspersed with the sound of "kamerad" and the moans of severely wounded men as small streams of sullen, dejected enemy swelled the total of prisoners. Gradually, the sounds subsided and a dangerous quiet fell upon the village, broken only by frequent bursts of shells or the scream of a nebelwerfer. Through this cold be seen the shadowy movements of small groups of men going about their work mopping up and preparing for what might come next . | | ibid. |
| 1/22/45 | after dark | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Defensive positions were taken facing south and southwest. | | |
| 1/22/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Hasty defensive positions were assumed and a road block established near Lorentswaldchen, Belgium (848893). Task Force Wemple on the left and the unit on the right in Neider-Emmels Belgium (838908) was contacted. Also, patrols were sent to the outskirts of St. Vith Belgium (855880) (See General Situation Map "Front Lines 221900 Jan 45 - 231400 Jan 45"). All men remained on the alter against probable counterattack and attacks by scattered groups of disorganized enemy. Artillery fire and nebelwerfer fire was heavy and constant throughout the night. | Lorentswaldchen (848893), Neider-Emmels (838908) and St. Vith (844880) | ibid. |
| 1/22/45 | Late | | 7th Armored Division | 7th Armored Division was ordered by Corps to seize St. Vith and an adjusted boundary with the 30th Inf. Div. was to become effective at midnight on 22 January. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/23/45 | | 517th PRCT (- 2nd Bn) | | Attached to 82nd Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 1/23/45 | 0000 | E Co. | | Strength listed at 3 Officers and 85 EM (vs. full strength of 8 officers and 140+ EM) | | |
| 1/23/45 | | 2nd Bn | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Throughout the period of 23 January 1945 units of CC"A" were engaged in changes of boundaries (as shown in allied documents to this report). Positions held by units of CC"A" were consolidated. | | |
| 1/23/45 | | 2nd Bn | | Ordered to establish defensive positions. Prepare for attack on St. Vith. Enemy planes strafe area on 2 occasions. Continue patrol activity. Combat Command B moves through positions and initiates attack on St. Vith. Company D ordered to reinforce Task Force Wemple. Receive new attack plan. | | Source: 517th morning reports as posted on website |
| Sometime later | | TF Seitz | | TF Seitz nominated (by ?) for a Presidential Distinguished Unit Citation for actions in St. Vith area. Gen. Seitz noted that the citation was later disapproved. | | |
| 1/23/45 | | 517th PRCT (-2 Bn) | 82nd Abn Div | 517h PRCT (less 2nd Bn.) attached to 82nd Airborne Division | | |
| 1/23/45 | 0100 | | | The original plan of attack gave Combat Command "R" (R = reserve) the mission of taking St. Vith. At 0100 on 23 January, the 48th Armored Infantry Battalion (-) and C/814th Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to CCR and plans were worked out for a coordinated attack employing the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, the 40th Armored Infantry Battalion and two tank companies. | | Source: After Action Report, Combat Command "A", 7th Armored Division |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|----------|----------|----------|--------------------|---|------------------------|--|
| 1/23/45 | Daylight | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Daylight arrived without any outstanding incidents except patrol action. The troops had now been without sleep, rest or much food for a period of 54 hours, continually attacking or advancing the entire time under most inclement weather conditions. Despite this, however, the spirit and morale of the unit was exceptionally high. | | Source: Files of Roy Landreth |
| 1/23/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | An example of this factor was demonstrated by the attack of D Company. The tanks bearing the infantry rushed across the field firing their assault guns at buildings and enemy assault guns. As buildings or assault guns would be hit and burst into flames, wild cheers of "Hit him again!" could be heard above the din of battle. One outstanding accomplishment was tat devotion to duty on the part of our medical section combined with the cooperation of tanks of Task Force Wemple in evacuating wounded saved many lives and ,much suffering on the part of troops in our task forces. no roads were open and evacuation was possible only by tanks and supply was practically impossible. | | Source: Files of Roy Landreth |
| 1/23/45 | Daylight | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At daylight, 23 January 1945, orders were received to organize a defensive position as shown on Special Situation Map No 3 and obtain as much rest as possible. Another force was to pass through and capture St. Vith Belgium (855880). Much rest was impossible; nevertheless, any was welcome. As a road from Born Belgium (853941) was opened, 10-in-1 rations and ammunition were brought in and wounded and prisoners were sent to the rear. Throughout the day, constant and heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on the town (see attached statement of artillery liaison officer). Enemy planes attacked and strafed the town twice. | Born (853941) | Source: Files of Roy Landreth |
| 1/23/45 | 1400 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 1400 hours 23 January 1945, , Combat Command "B" passed through Task Force Seitz, attacked and captured St. Vith Belgium (855880). From reports and enemy activity, a strong enemy counterattack was most probable. | | Source: Files of Roy Landreth |
| 1/23/455 | 1800 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 1800 Hours, 23 January 1945, Company D, which was in Task Force reserve, was ordered to reinforce Task Force Wemple, and moved to positions shown on Special Situation Map No. 3. All troops remained constantly on alert throughout the night. However, except for extremely heavy shelling, nothing of any importance materialized. Throughout the day 23 January 1945, the task force held its positions. (See General Situation Map [a word is missing, it could be "front"] Lines 231400 Jan 45 - 251400 Jan 45. | | Source: Files of Roy Landreth |
| 1/24/45 | 0800 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Assigned to clear the St. Vith - Ambleve Rd. | St. Vith - Ambleve Rd. | |
| 1/23/45 | 0930 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 0930, however, a change was made and, rather than CCR making the attack, Combat Command A was given the job of taking St. Vith. The 48th Armored Infantry Battalion (-) and C/814th Tank Destroyer Battalion were detached from CCR and attached to CCA. | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/24/45 | 1400 | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Secures positions along St. Vith - Ambleve Rd. | | |
| 1/23/45 | 1415 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | The attack on St. Vith jumped off at 1415, after a heavy artillery preparation. Only moderate ground resistance of small arms and machine gun fire was encountered in the attack although artillery and nebelwerfer fire was very heavy. | | ibid. |
| 1/23/45 | 1745 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 1745, St. Vith was taken, and defensive positions established around the town. | | ibid. |
| 1/23/45 | 2015 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | at 2015 an enemy counterattack of infantry and tanks from the southeast was broken up by artillery fire. | | ibid. |
| 1/23/45 | 2125 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 2125 another attempt to regain St. Vith was made using an estimated 200 infantrymen supported by at least two tanks was again dispersed by the use of artillery. | | ibid. |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|------------------------|------|------------|----------------------|--|--|--|
| 1/23/45 | 2250 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Once again at 2250 an attack of about a platoon of infantry was repelled. | | ibid. |
| 1/24/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Combat Command "A" had consolidated its positions on 24 January and prepared plans for an attack to seize and secure Wallerode. TF Rhea was to take the town, TF Griffin was to capture the high ground to the northwest of the town, while TF Seitz was to secure the high ground to the north of Wallerode. | Wallerode | ibid. |
| 1/24/45 | 1430 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 1430 24 January 45 FO #35 Hq CC"A" was issued by the Commanding Officer. The line up of Task Force Rhea, Task Force Wemple, Task Force Seitz, and Task Force Griffin was assigned mission as follows: Task Force Rhea to size, secure and defend Wallerode; Task Force Griffin to size and defend the high ground northwest of Wallerode; Task Force to seize and defend the high ground north of Wallerode; Task Force Wemple, in reserve, took up positions from which to bring direct fire on objectives. | | ibid. |
| 1/25/45 | 0100 | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | At 0100 on 25 January, the attack began. The advancing troops met heavy small arms fire, machine guns, artillery, mortar and nebelwerfer fire, but continued until all task forces had taken their objectives by 1725. | | ibid. |
| 1/25/45 | | | CCA (7th Armd Div) | H-Hour was set for 1000 25 January 45 and exactly at 1000 that date Task Forces Seitz, Rhea and Griffin jumped-off for their objectives. Small arms, machine gun, and artillery fire, all Task Forces succeeded in securing objectives before nightfall. The ground opposition in this attack on Wallerode and vicinity consisted chiefly of well dug-in infantry whose emplacements were connected by tunnels and dugouts. The points of high ground were well defended by dug-in infantry supported by mortars and machine guns. In addition, the houses along the route of advance were organized for defense. But the coordination of plans, the determination and bravery of the troops on the line, the combined use of all weapons in the attack added up to the success which this operation, and all operations reported herein, enjoyed. Such was the character of the attack at the close of the period patrols were pushed forward in the direction of the Division objective line when reports were received of an enemy retreat. | Wallerode | |
| 1/26/45 | | TF Seitz | CCA (7th Armd Div) | Co. E occupied (or helped to do so) I think this was near 26 January 1945. Co. E took seven prisoners from a basement in Hunnange. | | Source: Gene Brissey's notes on Chronology's First Draft |
| 25 Jan-45 to 26-Jan-45 | | TF Seitz | | Task Force Seitz moves through Der Eidt Woods towards departure point. Medell has not been captured as planned. 424 RCT (on flank) has not moved. Task Force Seitz crosses Ambleve (Ambleve?) - St. Vith Highway. Flanks are exposed. Company D is pinned down. Company F reaches woods near objective. Task Force objectives are captured. 30 enemy dead. Take 40 prisoners. Wallerode is captured. Progress on left flank of Task Force is stalled. 424 RCT captures Medill. Continue patrols. Ordered to rejoin combat team. | Der Eidt Woods, Medill, Ambleve - St. Vith Highway | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 1/26/45 | | | 7th Armored Division | For the most part, 26 January was spent in consolidation. | | |
| 26-Jan-45 or 27-Jan-45 | | E. Company | | from Hunnange, Co. E joined 7th Armored tanks and helped in the capture of St. Vith on 26th or 27th January 45. We did not enter St. Vith. E Co. was relieved and trucked to Stavelot where we rested for four days. | Hunnange | Source: Gene Brissey's notes on Chronology's First Draft |
| 1/26/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Detached from 82nd Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|---------|------|--------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|
| 1/27/45 | | 2nd Battalion | | The 7th Armored Division adjusted its positions on 27 January, preparatory to withdrawing from the sector. The 424th RCT relieved the 2nd Battalion, 517th Pcht, Inf. Regt. Completing the relief by 1500, at which time that unit was released from attachment to the 7th Armored Division and reverted to its parent unit. . | | Source: 7th Armored Division After Action Report, Period 1-31 January 1945 |
| 1/27/45 | | 517th PRCT (-1 Bn) | | Ordered to rejoin 82nd Abn for operations toward Siegfried Line & Germany. Planned direction: from north of St. Vith through Honsfeld/Scheid area. | Honsfeld / Scheid | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 1/27/45 | | 1st Bn | | Positioned to cover 325 GIB (glider infantry battalion) in flank attacks on Honsfeld/Scheid. | | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 1/26/45 | | 517th PRCT (-2 Bn) | 82nd Abn Div | 517h PRCT (less 2nd Bn.) detached from 82nd Airborne Division | | |
| 2/1/45 | | 517th | | | Honsfeld | |
| 2/1/45 | | 517th PRCT | 78th Infantry Division | Ordered to support V Corps (First Army) located in Eupen (Gen. Gerow). Attached to the 78th Infantry Division near Simmerath. Attack plan: Capture Schmidt. Prevent Germans from destroying Roer River dams. Attack through area adjacent 8th Infantry Division. | Simmerath, Schmidt | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 2/2/45 | | 517th PRCT | 78th Infantry Division | Operations continue in area of Bergstein, Schmidt, and Zerkall. Kall Valley. | | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 2/3/45 | | 517th PRCT | 78th Infantry Division | Infantry division forced to withdraw CP from Brandenburg. German defenders from 6th Parachute Division. (Heimbach Dam) | | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 2/3/45 | | 517th | 78th Inf Div | | Simmerath | |
| 2/3/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Attached to 82nd Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/3/45 | | 517th (-3rd Bn) | 82nd Abn Div | 517th PRCT (less 3rd Bn) attached to 82nd Airborne Division | | |
| 2/4/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Detached from 82nd Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/4/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Moved to Bergstein area | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/4/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Attached to 78th Inf. Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/4/45 | | 517th PRCT | 78th Inf Div | Attacks on Schmidt and surrounding area progressing slowly. (Mine Fields). | | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 2/5/45 | | 517th (-3rd Bn) | 82nd Abn Div | 517th PRCT (less 3rd Bn) detached from 82nd Airborne Division | | |
| 2/6/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Assigned to seize Schwammenauel Dam | Schmidt | |
| 2/6/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Attacked through a heavily mined area toward Schmidt-Nideggen Rd. | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/6/45 | | | | The 517th RCT was to move north to the Kleinhau - Bergstein area, relieve elements of the 8th Infantry and attack south from Bergstein during darkness on February 5th (6th?) to seize the Schmidt-Nideggen Ridge. | Kleinhau - Bergstein area | |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|---------|------|----------------------------------|--------------|--|-----------|--|
| 2/6/45 | 1800 | | 82nd Abn Div | All units had closed at Kleinhau. The German line ran from Zerkall West and South of Hill 400 to the Kall River. After dark the 2nd and 3rd Battalions moved into attack positions. | | |
| 2/6/45 | 2145 | | | 2nd Battalion moves down the lane through the minefields. | | |
| 2/7/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Detached from 78th Inf. Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/7/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Continued operations for 3 days within confines of largest minefield ever encountered on allied front. Company A joins attack on Zerkall. | | Source: 517th Morning Reports as posted on 517th website |
| 2/7/45 | | Task Force A (517th & 505th PIR) | | | | |
| 2/7/45 | 0000 | 517th PRCT | | The regiment attacked at midnight with the 2nd Bn on the right and the 3rd Bn on the left. In an attempt to surprise the Germans, Regiment decided to not to have any artillery prep. The (stealthiness of the) attack proceeded well for about an hour when the Germans lit the place up with flares and counterattacked the 3rd Bn. The 3rd Bn withdrew exposing the left flank of 2nd Bn. The Germans continued their counterattack against 2nd Bn and cut between the 1st and 2nd platoons of F Company, the lead company. | | Source: After Action Reports, Combat Command "A", 7th Armored Division |
| 2/7/45 | 0145 | | | At 0145 the 1st Battalion was 400 yards southeast of Hill 400. North of the Kall, the 2nd Battalion troopers came under savage machine gun and mortar fire. The 1st Battalion rearranged to Hill 400. | | |
| | | | | Gen Seitz recounted, "The next night, I think, 8-Feb-45, the Regiment again made a night attack." | | |
| | | | | Gen Seitz trying to remember the date of the attack. It was on the night of 7 February 1945. E Co. joined in the last attack on Kall Ravine. | | Source: Gene Brissey's notes on Chronology's First Draft |
| 2/8/45 | 0100 | E Co. | | E Co. and remains of F Co. at edge of Kall Ravine | | |
| 2/8/45 | | 517th | | The strengths of the 517th's three Infantry Battalions, each reduced to company size, would be relieved by the 508th Parachute Infantry that night. | | |
| 2/8/45 | | | | Note: I was wounded the next morning, February 8, '45. E Co. pulled back and started to dig in on an open hill near Bergstein. Ordered to move back to Bergstein. I was wounded as were several others. Some killed. We were a very small group at this time. This was the end of the last battle for the 517th. | Bergstein | Source: Gene Brissey's notes on Chronology's First Draft |
| 2/9/45 | | 517th | | Attached to 82nd Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/9/45 | | 517th | | Assembled near Huertgen | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/10/45 | | 517th | | Detached from 82nd | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/9/45 | | 517th | | Enter Schmidt. Relieved by 508th Parachute Regiment of 82nd Abn. Division. Ordered to proceed to Laon. Attached to newly arrived 13th Abn. Division. Move through Brandenburg, Aachen, Laon and finally Joigny, France. Prepare for Rhine jump. Require 800 replacements. Move to Bapaume Airfield. | | From 517th morning reports as posted on website |
| 2/9/45 | | 517th (- 3rd Bn) | 82nd Abn Div | 517th PRCT (less 3rd Bn) attached to 82nd Airborne Division | | |

| Date | Hour | Unit | Attached to | Activity | Location | Source: |
|--|------|--------------------------|---------------------|--|---|---------------------------------------|
| 2/10/45 | | 517th (- 3rd Bn) | 82nd Abn Div | 517th PRCT (less 3rd Bn) detached from 82nd Airborne Division | | |
| 2/11/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Attached to 13th Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/15/45 | | elements of the 517th | 13th Abn Div (9) | Elements of the 517th were attached to the 13th Airborne Division. | Which elements? Some of them (many men from E Co.) served with 82nd in Berlin | |
| 3/1/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Assigned to 13th Abn Division | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 3/1/45 | | 517th | 13th Abn Div. | 517th attached to | | |
| 8/20/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Arrived at New York (Camp Shanks?) | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 8/23/45 | | 517th PRCT | | Moved to Ft. Bragg | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
| 2/1/46 | | | 13th Abn Div. | 13th Abn Div deactivated | | |
| 2/25/46 | | 517th PRCT | | 517th Deactivated at Ft. Bragg. | | WWII Order of Battle - Shelby Stanton |
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| | | | | | | |
| Weblinks for units to which the 517th (and elements thereof) were attached | | | | | | |
| (1) 17th Abn Division - http://www.ww2-airborne.us/18corps/17abn/17_overview.html | | | | | | |
| (2) 36th Infantry Division - http://www.ghg.net/burtond/36th/36infhist.html | | | | | | |
| (3) 1st Airborne Task Force - http://www.ww2-airborne.us/18corps/other_overview.html | | | | | | |
| (4) XVIII Airborne Corps - http://www.ww2-airborne.us/18corps/18_overview.html | | | | | | |
| (5) 30th Infantry Division - http://30thinfantry.org/ OR http://www.oldhickory30th.com/ | | | | | | |
| (5) 30th Infantry Division - http://www.oldhickory30th.com/ | | | | | | |
| (6) 82nd Airborne Division - http://www.bragg.army.mil/82dv/ | | | | | | |
| (6) 82nd Airborne Division - http://www.lonesentry.com/usdivisions/links/airborne/division/82nd_airborne_division.html | | | | | | |
| (6) 82nd Airborne Division - http://www.ww2-airborne.us/division/82_overview.html | | | | | | |
| (7) 7th Armored Division - http://members.aol.com/dadswar/7ada.htm | | | | | | |
| (7) 7th Armored Division - http://members.aol.com/dadswar/7ada.htm | | | | | | |
| (7) 7th Armored Division - http://home.comcast.net/~johnstonww | | | | | | |
| (7) 7th Armored Division - http://www.lonesentry.com/usdivisions/links/armored/division/7th_armored_division.html | | | | | | |
| (8) 78th Infantry Division - http://www.78thdivision.org/ | | | | | | |
| (9) 13th Airborne Division - http://www.ww2-airborne.us/18corps/13abn/13_overview.html | | | | | | |
| (9) 13th Airborne Division - http://www.thedropzone.org/units/13thhistory.html | | | | | | |
| (10) http://www.criba.be/ | | | | | | |
| (10) www.isidore-of-seville.com/bulge/6.html - | | | | | | |