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Ben,

Hal and I regret that we will not be able to attend the Portland Reunion this summer.  Regarding future reunions, we feel that Option 3 is the best way to go for future reunions.  My own opinion for locations is to have the reunions on a rotating basis geographically.  It was the East Coast last year, West Coast this year, and I think the Midwest would be good for next year.  In these geographic regions, it could be the northern, middle or southern part of each region.  This would give the younger families reason to make it a family vacation as well as attending the reunion itself.  I feel that if we have it one place all the time, people will get tired of seeing the same thing all the time.  I know that the Frice Committee has been working hard, and all of the efforts will be certainly appreciated by those attending the Reunion.  I am sure that all those attending will have a great time in Portland.

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Activities of Lt. Co. Cato’s Group

 

 At 0430 hours, Co. Cato assembled two Hq. Battery plane loads and proceeded to look for the equipment bundles.  Having found the bundles the group moved off to the predesignated Bn. assembly area.  Sporadic small arms firing was encountered enroute and also a German machine gun nest.  Col. Cato organized his small group into an assault squad and attacked with a submachine gun, bazooka, 50 cal. Machine gun, grenades and individual arms.  The installation was neutralized and the group proceeded.

 

Major Frank’s Group

 

 At 0700, one round of smoke was fired into the wall concealed 88 position.  Although the guns could not be seen, the opening and closing of the 88’s breach blocks could be heard and personnel were seen moving about.  After the 1st round was fired, five volleys of time fire were put in the probably gun position.  After five rounds, some confusion was noted but it was not possible to see whether any damage had been done.  The CP party then left the observation post and returned to Howitzer position.  March order was given and the column went on the march through the hills to the Bn. position.  After the column had cleared the area, the English speaking Frenchman brought word that there were some casualties, a great deal of confusion and that the Germans had moved out of the position with seven guns and 25 trucks.

 

 The column completed its march with no organized resistance, arriving and joining the Bn. at 1800 hours D Plus 1.

 

 460th F. A. BN
(III)

 

Battalion CP

 

 Starting at 0700 hours, D Plus 1, the 11 Howitzers at the Bn. position fired continuously until 1930 hours.  At 1945 hours, a preparation was fired for the attack at 2000 hours.  Nineteen support missions and two counter battery missions were fired for an overall total of 800 rounds.  A strong counter attack was turned back and completely disorganized.  Reports from forward observers and liaison officers indicated large numbers of enemy casualties from time fire.  Concentrations were very effective and the Artillery definitely proved its worth.

 

 At 1800 hours, D Plus 1, the Battalion was completely organized with 15 Howitzers in position ready to fire.  Every man and officer was accounted for and surprisingly no one was missing.  One officer and one enlisted man had been killed in action.  Other casualties were as follows:

 

 Injured on Jump …………… two Officers
     23 Enlisted Men
 Wounded in Action ……….. Eight Officers
 Other Evacuations ………… Three Enlisted Men

 

Operational Notes:

 

 The Howitzers that came in with the gliders for resupply proved most effective in supplementing the fires of the Howitzers already in position.

 

 A total of 32 609’s were dropped, one failed to function and five were lost.  Two 284’s were dropped and due to a parachute malfunction on a 284, was damaged beyond repair.  The second 284 landed in perfect condition.

 

 A total of 571 men and officers were dropped with only three malfunctions in personnel chutes.  In each of the three cases, reserves were used and the personnel did not suffer any injuries.

 

 Ground control patterns proved successful in 90% of the planes.  Two Howitzers were not completely assembled due to lost and damaged parts.

 

 Although the Bn. was dispersed over a large area, the bulk of the men and material landed close enough together so that two Howitzers were in the predesignated position by 0600 hours.  One Battery in operation at 0800 hours and 11 Howitzers in position by 1300 hours on D Day.  The remaining Howitzers occupied positions and reported location to the Bn. Commander who ordered them to report to the predesignated Bn. position.

 

 Upon completion of the counter Battery mission on D Plus 1, the four remaining Howitzers reported into the Bn. position at 1800 hours.

 

 On D Plus 2, all 15 Howitzers were able to fire after minor ordnance repairs.

 

 The main criticism of re-supply seems to be that the supplies were scattered over too large an area.  Very few came close to the DZ and those that did were gathered up by the individuals who happened to be in the vicinity.  The supplies that landed away from the DZ were also picked up by anyone who happened to be in that area, but the largest proportion of these supplies were gathered by the

 

460th F. A. BN.
(IV)

 

 Glider troops who had transportation to locate them and haul them immediately.  Therefore, due to the widely scattered pattern, it was a race between men on foot and men in vehicles with the "lion’s share" going to the motorized elements.  Partial readjustments were made later, but the whole re-supply plea was completely disrupted from a Parachute Battalion viewpoint.

 

 It is believed that many supplies were not bound because the natives and Army personnel tore the chutes form the bundles for souvenirs and other purposes.  Thus making the location of the bundles very difficult.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 

 1.  It is recommended that when the first wave of gliders came in that some transportation be immediately allocated to Parachute Troops for the purpose of locating and gathering supplies that do not land on or near the DZ.

 

 2.  The most critical shortages occurred in signal equipment.  Therefore, an immediate re-supply of wire, radio batteries, radio tubes and telephones is recommended.

 

 3.  It is also recommended that a higher priority be given to Airborne Troop for transportation when the ground troops arrive.

 

 4.  As for percentages of types of ammunition, the following changes are recommended:

 

  Smoke ………………….. 10 to 20%
  HE ……………………… 85 to 75%
      ½ M54
      ¼ M48
  Heat …………………….. 5%  CI

 

 CONCLUSIONS:

 

 In general, the operation was well planned and well coordinated.  This greatly facilitated the troops in making plans and being able to carry out plans as arranged.  The lack of usual last minute changes was most important for the men and officers, and neither of the two were nervous or tense, they knew exactly what to do upon reaching the ground.  It is the opinion of this officer that careful planning and lack of changes was the deciding factor in the success of the operation.

 

RAYMOND L. CATO
Lt. Col., 517th Inf., CI
Commanding, 450th PFA Bn.