| I’ll
briefly provide some background on the 517’s involvement in the recapture
of St. Vith. When the Germans commenced the Ardennes offensive, the allies
determined after a day or so that it was a major offensive. Prior to the
offensive, the 7th Armored Division which was in Germany, was suddenly
moved at night to the critical roadbed of St. Vith. St. Vith is a critical
road junction along the quickest route to Leige and other points which the
Germans had in mind.
After about three or four days of
intense fighting, General Ridgeway ordered the 7th Armored Division to
withdraw from St. Vith on the 21st of December for the purpose shortening
the lines and to consolidate the defense of the XVIII Airborne Corps back
along the line of Malmedy-Ambleve. When the Allies commenced their
counter-offensive in the early part of January, both the 7th Armored
Division and 30th Infantry Division were under XVIII Airborne Corps
command. Both units were roughly positioned behind Werbomont and Stavelot.
General Ridgeway directed that the 7th Armored and 30th Infantry attack to
the southeast to capture St. Vith.
I recall my battalion was in XVIII Airborne
Corps reserve, the Corps being commanded by General Ridgeway. About this
time, the 11th of January, the 2nd Battalion of the 517th was detached
from the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment and attached to CCA of the 7th
Armored Division. The CCA was commanded by Col. Triplet, who was a tall
large man with a lot of armor and combat experience. I felt Triplet was
truly an outstanding leader as well as a great human being. Triplet
organized what was called Task Force Seitz, a force consisting of 2/517th
PIR, B Co.17th Tank Battalion, an anti-tank platoon and a group of
engineers. After forming the task force we spent a couple of days waiting
for the XVIII Airborne Corps to give the order for the drive to St. Vith
to start. As an aside, I would also like to point out something amusing
that happened here. The first time I reported to Col. Triplet, I arrived
at his CP and received my orders at the time his commanders briefing was
breaking up and needless to say Col. Triplet was quite upset. I told him
in no uncertain terms the reason I was late was I had walked to his
goddamn CP, and as it turned out he had two jeeps and trailers that were
out hauling ammunition, so Triplet was concerned that I didn't have any
transportation. Triplet than gave me a half-track with the best
communications that I've ever had during the war, and several other
wheeled vehicles. Col. Triplet then told me: "Seitz, my crystal ball tells
me that this Auf der Hardt Woods is an infantry job, and I want you to
attack Auf der Hardt Woods."
At the time, I had moved the task force to
an assembly position in a wooded area near Am Kreuz. Auf der Hardt Woods
dominated the entire area including Born, which was the objective of Task
Force Whipple in addition to Diedenberg which they recently captured,
which then released me to make my attack. Triplet had told me that I could
attack at any time that I wanted to. After making a daylight
reconnaissance with my S-3, and because of the long expanse of open
terrain, about a mile and a quarter to the objective, and the very deep
snow, no cover and concealment, I decided that I would make the attack
during the hours of darkness. But a key point that influenced me was a
piece of intelligence we received from Division G-2 which concerned a
captured German document. The document stated that when Americans were
employing tanks it was unlikely that the they would attack at night. I
felt that this intelligence was certainly a plus for making an attack
during the hours of darkness.
My plan was to attack with two companies
abreast, E Company on the right and D Company on the left and F Company in
reserve. I planned no initial supporting artillery or mortar fire for the
attack, but I did have specific artillery fire pre-planned for certain
spots on call. I instructed the TD platoon I had on hand to hold and
remain silent until I observed the outpost by Auf der Hardt Woods. On my
order they were to close rapidly on the woods and I estimated this to be
the beginning morning nautical twilight. My attack really depended a lot
on surprise on what was considered a sole enemy outpost on the forward
edge of the woods I also hoped to surprise the main German force which I
had knowledge were also pretty well bunkered up.
The weather was cold as hell and it was
snowing, in some places it was up to the soldiers' waists and in general
it was above the knees. We jumped off at four o'clock in the morning.
Prior to the attack, I estimated that if we had no problems it would take
us two and a half to three hours to get to our objective. The fact it was
snowing reduced the visibility considerably, but I felt afterward that
this helped screen my preparatory movements as well as my movements during
the attack. The attack was slow and difficult through the deep snow. As
the attack unfolded, the one thing that worried me were communications and
control of the unit due to the lack of visibility. I appreciated the fact
that the falling snow more or less screened our movement from the Germans.
We made a special effort to have connecting skirmish lines, side by side,
to maintain contact because I wanted to maintain radio silence as well as
all other silence. The troops were pretty loaded down with ammunition,
although I had told them to leave all overcoats behind because I thought
the overcoats would impede their movement through the deep snow plus they
would be sweating a lot moving for two to three
hours.
Just about the beginning of BMNT, which was
about 8 o'clock, we surprised the outpost, and captured its defenders. The
Germans had been in the area for a considerable time and they had lots of
bunkers, which later on in the day would give us considerable trouble.
During the attack our people killed several Germans, wounded about 30, and
took about 16 or 17 prisoners. Meanwhile, the tanks closed up and passed
through the woods, according to the plan. The Germans were completely
surprised, although the Germans fought stubbornly, and D Company, as I
recall, had a lot of trouble clearing out the Germans in their sector.
During the melee, there was allot of sniping and the commander of E
Company estimated that he had killed 40 or 50 Germans. By about 10 o'clock
I was confident that we had the objective in hand. Prior to the attack, I
asked the D Company commander to send out a combat patrol to the southwest
of the objective to the village of Hockkreuz which was 3/4 of a mile south
of the woods. There was a important road that ran from the river up north
to St. Vith. I thought we could expect a counter attack from that area.
The counterattack never materialized but the patrol captured a Mark IV
tank and the crew. The patrol then moved to another small town, I don’t
recall the name, which was along that road. There they ran into problems,
they did not surprise the Germans and some of our TD's were ambushed and
destroyed by German self-propelled guns.
At this time I got word from CCA that taking
Born was proving to be more difficult than anticipated, and there was also
a rumor that the Peiper Group was holding Born. As you recall, they were
the infamous force that massacred American Prisoners at Malmedy. Around
midnight on the 21st after the attack on Auf der Hardt Woods, CCA ordered
the 517th again to lead the attack on another woods, its name I cannot
remember. This time I put D Company on tanks and Triplet gave me a bunch
of half-tracks to carry E and F Companies and we moved down towards the
wood without any difficulty. It was the terrain there that proved more
challenging than anything else. As I recall, the tanks and TDs (tank
destroyers) got through very well but E and F had to dismount from the
half-tracks and cover the remaining two miles on foot. We started at
midnight and midway through the next morning we were in that woods with no
great opposition except some mortar fire and artillery fire. The woods
provided the assembly area for our attack on Hunnange. Triplet gave us the
mission of attacking Hunnange which was a key terrain and road net. The
capture of Hunnange ensured the capture of St. Vith. We spent most of
mid-day in those woods, so I had plenty of time to conduct reconnaissance
and formulate my plan. I wanted to attack at noon rather than waiting
until the next day and Triplet gave me the OK. I was very proud of this
attack, I put D Company on tanks again, F Company on foot and E Company in
reserve, and I decided to attack at 1700 at the beginning of evening
nautical twilight. In the plan, I called on my artillery liaison officer
to find out how much artillery we could get because I wanted the TOT to be
fired on Hunnange just as F Company moved across the line of departure. He
was very successful in that task, getting all the 7th Armored Division
artillery, Corps Artillery, and the 30th Division artillery, an estimated
17 battalions of artillery firing on the TOT. The plan called for F
Company to move out first and after crossing the line of departure the TOT
would fire. Next, tanks with D Company on board would pass through F
Company and after employing shock-action tactics would clear out Hunnange
before the effects of the TOT could wear off. The plan worked perfectly. D
Company and the tanks got into town very quickly, and it was quite a
sight. It was open terrain for about 600 to 700 yards and I remember
watching these tanks firing their cannons and the people on top firing the
.50 calibres, it was like the 4th of July. The assault was truly was an
example of shock-action tactics. As we entered the town many Germans came
out of buildings and basements and some of them continued shooting and
sniping at us.
I think two things were crucial to the
attack. First, surprise I don't think the Germans expected us to attack
that evening. Second, and most obvious, the tremendous artillery support
we received. Again, the plan called for that when we captured Hunnange, a
strong combat patrol would move down the main highway towards St. Vith,
anticipating a German counterattack. During the assault on Hunnange, we
captured numerous German equipment killed many Germans. The assault was
involved in close combat for about three hours. I sent the combat patrol
about 3/4 of a mile north of St. Vith which was a pretty good piece of
terrain on that road, and they were to move to at least that point and
hold there and set up a defensive position to prevent reinforcements from
coming to St. Vith for a counterattack. In the morning I sent a platoon of
tanks to this position and got word from CCA, I remembered I received an
order from Triplet and he said "Well done, hold in place, take it easy."
About 4 o'clock that afternoon CCB Gen. Bruce Clarke, photographers and
all the newspaper people in the XVIII Corps area came rolling through, I
think Task Force Rhea was in the lead. I think my people were
surprised and relieved that they weren’t required to attack St. Vith.
Unknown, to us at the time, the Germans had evacuated the town after we
took Hunnange.
I've gone back to look at that area. It is
the dominating terrain and road junction north of St. Vith. However, the
last time I went back was hardly anything there. My wife and I went to a
small restaurant near the road junction, in my mind’s eye it looked a hell
of a lot bigger in '45.
For their actions in the St. Vith sector,
2/517 (Task Force Seitz) was nominated for a Presidential Distinguished
Unit Citation.
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