I have received  a note from Leo Dean indicating that he has received mail from Brad Stewart requesting information about his father,  Mark Stewart, who was a Lieutenant in H Co.  Can anyone help? - Ben

Howard Hensleigh

Ben and Wayne Cross.  Thanks Wayne for finding this report.

Note regarding the 18th Corps report on the taking and holding of Manhay. 

If they are interested in this old buzzard's view of that 18th AB Corps report, here it is.  Ridgeway ordered us (3rd Bn.), less G Co., to take Manhay "at all costs".  G Co. was guarding Ridgeway's CP.  He did provide a lot of preparatory artillery support, but some of the big guns waited a few minutes after the cease fire time limit, then continued to fire with their rounds also falling short and wiping out Lt. Stott's I Co. platoon which was leading the attack, Stott being among the KIA.  So, with two rifle companies, less one platoon, headquarters company, the 1st platoon of the 596th and a demolitions section from SERVICE COMPANY (emphasis purposely added for SERVICE COMPANY members and descendants) we took Manhay.  It didn't fall mainly to us to take the town, it fell entirely to us.  Anyone who wrote that we had tank support wasn't within ten miles of the action and had no knowledge of the facts; we had no tank support during the attack nor afterwards.  Rather than being attached to the 7th Armored Division, we must have been attached to the 3rd Armored Division.  When Bill Boyle reported to Maj. Gen Rose, 3rd Armored Division CO, he reported to him in his HQ in Manhay.  Manhay was then was lost to the enemy and we were ordered to retake it.  7th Armored Division at the time was being kicked out of St. Vith and later Dick Seitz and his 2nd Bn. cleared the way by taking the high ground unsuitable for tanks that allowed 7th Armored to retake St. Vith.  (Another clear indication that the writer of the report did not know what he was talking about.)  Then, what German units did we take the town from??  I do not see any mention of SS among the units we captured.  One of the 3rd Bn. bazooka boys disabled the SS commander's tracked command vehicle and I got a batch of Items out of it, including pictures I still have of him with his iron cross and SS retreat formations of the unit.  All the prisoners I sent back, and there were at least 50 of them, wore SS uniforms and were identified as SS troops in their "sold books".  Not all the prisoners made it to regiment as some tried to escape and made it successfully or were shot down by their 517th escorts to the rear.  The report does not state that we were bombed by our own Air Corps.  It also states that we received support of a tank platoon from the 7th Armored Division.  The only tank that came into town when we held it didn't stay long and provided no  support.  Before a 3rd Bn. S-2 patrol wiped it out, the Germans had an observation post that directed antitank fire right down the main drag of Manhay.  While this OP was in operation a tank buzzed into town stopping at the main cross roads.  A 517th trooper told the tank commander to get the hell out of there.  While he stood up in the turret and mouthed off to the trooper an antitank round hit him killing him instantly and throwing him to the pavement.  The shell, requiring a higher density impact to detonate, exploded as it bounced down the street beyond the tank.  The rest of the crew needed no urging to get out of town  and did not stay long enough for me to ask them what unit they were from.  It must have been from the 3rd, rather than the 7th, Armored Division, however, given the position of those units at that time.  

Albin Dearing, regimental S-2, told me at the Albany reunion that while he was on Ridgeway's staff in Korea he had to point out a few facts to Ridgeway to raise the generals opinion of the 517th.  I can understand Ridgeway's love for the 82nd and 101st because of the way they were formed and his long time command association with them. 

That does not excuse his failure to recognize or reward with citations the smaller units in his 18th Airborne Corps, nor does it excuse the sloppy misstatements of his own staff in writing up reports such as the one we have just read. 

Howard Hensleigh