Wayne Cross sent me for comment the Advanced Infantry Officers Course 1948-9 submission of Capt. Roland L. Gohmert on the attack of the 3rd Bn. at Bergstein.

 My initial comments are that we owe Capt. Gohmert a debt of gratitude for making this report part of our 517th PRCT history.  It is the most detailed account I have read.  Although the 3rd Bn. may be more thoroughly covered, the parts played by the other two infantry Bns. and the the 460th and 596 are not omitted.  The author gives a realistic account of the condition of the battalion when we were thrown into this attack as well as the torturous struggle of the depleted units of the Combat Team to reach the objectives they were ordered to take.  

I have a problem with Gohmert's  billing himself as the 3rd Bn. communications officer as I am quite sure Tommy Priest held that slot all through combat.  Gohmert may have been Tommy's assistant platoon leader, or there is a possibility that Tommy became a full time executive officer of HQ. Co. with Gohmert heading the communications platoon.  Tommy held down both jobs for a long time.

I must repeat that the 3rd Bn. was the last serial in the Combat Team convoy, with each serial leaving one hour after the one ahead of it hit the road.   We left in the very late afternoon with less than an hour before we were driving blackout through devastated places like Aachen, and made it to the Bergstein area before anyone else.  The guide that was sent back to divert us to detruck at Kleinhau didn't get to us and we detrucked very close to Bergstein itself before day break.

If Scrappy Stewart did not wish to discuss his combat experiences with his family, Bergstein is good reason.  We saw from the morning reports that he was wounded there and went through the hell that almost wiped out H Co.  He was one of many and my big loss was our 460th liaison officer, "Woody" Woodhull, who was cut down by a burst of machinegun fire right beside me while we directed artillery in support of the attacks of G and H.  Another big loss was Jim Birder, I Co. CO, KIA by a mine, and Pazinsky (sp?) CO of G Co. was relieved and Steele, the Exec. of G Co. was overcome by emotion and combat fatigue before he could take over command of the company.  The same losses went down through the ranks of the entire outfit as we pulled the chestnuts out of the fire for the outfits that were to make the main attack while we fooled the enemy by making them think we, the paratroops, were the spearhead of the main attack.  The author mentions that Col. Graves was not told that we were ordered to make a diversionary attack, and I must say that this is SOP, standard operating procedure.  It is my understanding that a commander ordered to make a diversionary attack never should be privileged to such information, as it would spoil the operation.  If all you were to do was make a farce of an attack to fool the enemy, the enemy probably would catch onto the farce and be looking for something else.  Sherman said, "War is Hell!" and from the hell we endured at Bergstein, we can be proud that we pulled off a successful diversionary attack.  That is the only upbeat thing I can say about Bergstein.

Howard Hensleigh