After Action Report, 7th Armored Division, Jan 1945

The 7th Armored Division's stand at ST. VITH, Belgium from 17 to 23 December, 1944, had split Von Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive. Directed to withdraw from the ST. VITH sector, the Division was immediately committed in the vicinity of Manhay, Belgium until relieved on 30 December. January, 1945, saw the Division return to ST. VITH. As the month opened the Division was in an assembly area in the vicinity of AYWAILLE in Corps reserve of the XVIII Corps (Airborne). The Division had not emerged unscathed from the "Battle of the Bulge". In spite of reinforcements, the effective combat personnel was down to 70%. The Division's effective medium tanks were 56% of normal strength. The Division absorbed reinforcements, rehabilitated personnel, and carried on maintenance of vehicles and equipment. On 20 January, an attack was launched against ST. VITH from the north. The towns of DEIDENBERG, BORN, and HUNNINGEN were taken successively in the course of the drive and ST. VITH was re-entered on 23 January. With this important road center secured, the Division continued operations to the South and East of ST. VITH until relieved on 28 January. The Division moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of EUPEN and on 29 January was attached to the V Corps. As the month closed, effective combat personnel was up to 80%, and medium tank strength was 78.5%. The Division was again in Corps reserve undergoing a period of rest, training and rehabilitation after its operations in the ST. VITH sector.

January, 1945, opened with the 7th Armored Division as Corps reserve of the XVIII Corps (Airborne) in an assembly area near AYWAILLE, Belgium. The division order of battle was as follows:

Attached to the division were the 203rd AAA Bn., 446th QM Tr. Co., 3967th QM Tr. Tr. Co., 275th Arm'd FA Bn. (105 SP), and the 14th Cavalry Group. The 14th Cavalry Group, however, was released from attachment to the division at 011330 January. Attached to the division for administration only were CCB of the 9th Arm'd Div. and the 814th TD Bn., the latter of which was under tactical attachment of the 75th Inf. Div. The Division Artillery was also supporting the 75th Inf. Div.

During the ST. VITH operation and ensuing action at MANHAY in December, the division had suffered heavy losses in both men and vehicles. Early in January, reinforcements were received, trained and absorbed. New weapons were fired and new vehicles and equipment issued.

Problems that confronted the division in the first part of January were the snow and cold that made roads slippery and very difficult to travel, and the lack of suitable billets in the areas assigned to the division. To be within the Corps boundary, the division had to move all of elements west of the

Combat Command "A" was alerted to move on 1 hour notice after 012000 January, to block enemy penetration in the zone of the 75th Inf. Div. The alert was lifted on 020930 January upon Corps order.

A new XVIII Corps (Airborne) boundary was set and the division again had to move all of its elements that were south of the WERBOMONT-HAMOIR road to the area north of that road. In spite of difficulty in obtaining suitable billets, the move was completed by 031030 January.

In view of the fact that the terrain in which the division was likely to operate was close and rugged, the Commanding General ordered training in the use of small teams of infantry, tanks, and engineers. Where mass employment of tanks would be impossible, these small teams could operate over roads or trails to gain the rear of the enemy forces to make surprise seizures of important road centers or defiles.

The tank component of these teams was to be small; rarely, if ever, over a platoon. The infantry component was to be comparatively large to provide reconnaissance and security for the tanks, while the engineers were for mine detection, removal of road blocks, and pioneer work.

In compliance with these orders the combat commands organized small task forces and conducted special training and problems throughout the entire first half of the month.

The Division Artillery was relieved from the mission of reinforcing the 75th Inf. Div. and reverted to division control on 030900 January. On 051800 January, the 275th Arm'd FA Bn., was detached from the 7th Armored Division and attached to the 82nd Airborne Division. The 814th TD Bn. was returned to division control from the 75th Inf. Div. on 051100 January.

A Camouflage Team from the First U. S. Army visited the division's tank battalions on 5 January to give technical advice and assist in camouflaging the vehicles. On 10 January, the division became the first unit in the First U. S. Army to paint its tanks white for camouflage.

The division was given a warning order by the XVIII Corps (Airborne) at 061430 January, to conduct a reconnaissance of the 82nd Airborne Division's zone for possible routes on which to employ parts of the 7th Armored Division. Combat Command "B" was alerted for the mission. The purpose of any attack that would see the division committed, would be to relieve the pressure in front of the 3rd Arm'd Division zone and on the BASTOGNE salient. The reconnaissance of the routes was completed on 7 January, but it was not necessary to commit the division.

Combat Command "B" of the 9th Armored Division, which had been attached to the division during the defense of ST. VITH, and remained attached for administration only, was relieved on 070001 January.

The training program continued and an officer and NCO school was held for selected members of each unit. Schooling in Chemical Warfare Defensive Measures and the proper technique of directing and sensing artillery fire was conducted. It was discovered during the problems that the snow on the ground muffled the sound of the tanks. By careful movement, tanks were able to get to within 200-300 yards of an objective without being discovered. This information was passed to the division by Col. DWIGHT L. ROSEBAUM, Combat Command "A" Commander.

The alternate thawing and freezing of the snow had made the roads very icy. Grousers or similar traction aids for the division's full-tracked vehicles were badly needed, but could not be procured. Lt. Col. REGINALD H. HODGSON, G-4, and Lt. Col. GEORGE M. HUGHES, Division Ordnance Officer, together devised a cleat

to be installed on the duck feet track extensions of medium tanks so that they might negotiate on an icy surface. This traction aid was the duck bill track extension cut in half with one half being welded into the edge or the track extensions to stick over the surface the track 3/4 of an inch. These cleats were placed on the tracks, ten to a side, and upon demonstration proved very feasible makeshifts, although not expected to last for a long time. Distribution was made to the tank battalions, the FA battalions and the 814th TD Bn.

At noon of 11 January, the division began a two-day and one-night march by infiltration over two routes to an assembly area in the vicinity, VERVIERS-SPA. The 2nd Battalion of the 517th Parachute Inf. Regt. the 509th Parachute Inf. Bn., were attached to the division at 110900 January. The 275th Arm'd FA Bn., was returned to the division at 111200 January. The division was notified that the 508th Parachute Regt. (3 Battalions) would be available on call. A detachment of the 994th Engineer Treadway Bridge Co., was attached and the 299th Engr C Bn., placed in direct support at 121700 January. The movement to the new assembly area was completed by 131503 January.

Field Order #16 was published by the division at 131500 January, based on XVIII Corps (Airborne) Field Order #2 (112000 January). Corps was to attack at 130800A January to secure a line LA NEUVILLE-HOUVEGNEZ-WAIMES. The attack was to be continued to seize and secure ST. VITH and the high ground along the general line BEHO-MALDANGE-ST. VITH-AMBLEVE.

The 7th Armored Division was to remain in assembly area prepared to attack on Corps order. The division's mission was to "pass rapidly through 1st Infantry Division in zone of action; attack and destroy enemy wherever found in ST. VITH area;

Destroy his road traffic; seize ST. VITH; and on further Corps order, organize and defend this road center; reconnoiter to south and east of ST. VITH; protect Corps left (east) flank".

From 14 to 19 January, the division remained in Corps reserve and completed the final preparations for its attack. 1500 white mattress covers were issued to the units as snow camouflage garments on 14 January. 125 snow capes were also received and distributed. On 20 January, 1500 additional two-piece white camouflage suits were issued to bring the total distributed to an amount sufficient to equip each line infantryman with a mattress cover or camouflage suit, and in addition key personnel of tank battalions, artillery battalions, the Engineer battalion and the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron were equipped.

At 181800 January, B Co of the 738th Tank Bn. (Mine Exploders) and the 987th FA Bn. were attached to the division.

The Combat Commands were grouped into the following task forces for the coming operations:

The task forces were organized and the division prepared to attack upon Corps order, when on 18 January the boundary between the 30th Inf. Div., and the 7th Arm'd Div., was changed by Corps due to the slow progress of the other attacking units. This change in boundary removed the ST. VITH portion of the division's objective which then extended from the high ground north of ST. VITH to the north and east to AMBLEVE.

The division CP moved to WAIMES on 19 January and Combat Commend "A" and Combat Command "B" moved into the final attack positions, closing in assembly areas in the vicinity of WAIMES during the night 19-20 January. A combination of hilly terrain, snow, and ice made the movement difficult.

At 200730 January, the 7th Armored Division began its attack south through the sector held by the 1st and 30th Infantry Divisions. The day was cold with snow falling. The immediate objective of Combat Command "A" was the village of DEIDENBERG. TF WEMPLE attacked the village from the north and northeast at 0930, and as enemy resistance was light, had taken it by 1030. TF RHEA passed through TF WEMPLE and by 1530 had secured the high ground to the southeast of the village despite heavy enemy small arms fire from houses in that zone. No artillery or armor were encountered. TF SEITZ moved into position prepared to attack through the other two forces to take the AUF DER HARDT woods to the south.

Combat Command "B" launched a coordinated attack against BORN at 1630. According to the plan of attack TF B was to attack astride the road from the west while TF C was to come in from the northwest. TF A was held in reserve prepared to support TF B. The tanks of TF C were held up by mines and impassable terrain so that the attack was launched with TF B and the infantry of TF C.

Deep snow and cold caused a large number of frostbite casualties. It was estimated that the town was defended by 200 infantry supported by at least thee[2] tanks and assault guns, TF A was committed at 1715 and the attack continued through the night and during the day of 21 January. At 0800 the 38th Arm'd Inf. Bn., was released from Combat Command "R" to reinforce Combat Command "B" and A/38 was used to complete the mopping up from house to house entering BORN at 1700. By 1800 organized enemy resistance had ceased.

In the fall of snow flurries and continued cold weather, the elements of Combat Command "A" continued to advance on 21 January. TF SEITZ took the high ground to the south of DEIDENBERG meeting moderate enemy resistance in the form of small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. TF RHEA moved east to secure a more advantageous defensive position to the south of EIBERTINGEN. The 508th RCT began moving into the area as planned and upon detrucking attached to the 7th Armored Division and Combat Command "A" at 1530. It relieved the Combat Command "A" task forces by 2325 and assumed the defense of the DEIDENBERG-EIBERTINGEN region. The team was composed of the 508th Pcht. Inf. Regt., the 319th FA Glider Bn., D/307th Engr. Bn., and B/80 AAA Bn.

On 22 January, Combat Commend Reserve which had been in division reserve, occupied and assumed the responsibility of the defensive positions held by Combat Command "A". The 508th Pcht. Inf. Regt., was attached to Combat Command "R" at 0800, and the relief of Combat Command "A" was completed by 0930. Combat Command "R" also relieved elements of the 23rd Regimental Combat Team in the vicinity of MONTENAU and IVELDINGEN, completing the relief by 1540.

Combat Command "A", after being relieved, was to attack south to seize HUNNINGEN and the wooded area to the east of HUNNINGEN.

A task force from Combat "B" Command was to assist in the attack. This task force known as TF BEATY, consisted of C/31st Tk Bn., B/48th Arm'd Inf. Bn., A/33rd Arm'd Engr. Bn., and 1/C/814th TD Bn.

Task Forces SEITZ and WEMPLE jumped off at 1000 and rapidly pushed south in the face of moderate resistance in the form of small arms and anti-tank fire. The speedy advance disorganized the enemy. Little artillery fire was received, and no contact with armor was reported, the enemy infantry bearing the brunt of the attack.

TF BEATY, attached to Combat Command "A" at 1435, pushed toward HUNNINGEN and by 1700 had reached the village. TF SEITZ and TF WEMPLE reached the objective at 1745 and by 1900 the combined forces had ended all enemy resistance there. TF RHEA followed Forces SEITZ and WEMPLE, mopping up pockets of resistance that had been isolated in the rapid advance, and took up positions along the southern edge of the IN EIDT woods to the northeast of HUNNINGEN. The division now controlled the high ground overlooking the pile of rubble that had once been ST VITH only 2,000 yards away.

Late on 22 January, the 7th Armored Division was ordered by Corps to seize ST. VITH and an adjusted boundary with the 30th Inf. Div., was to become effective at midnight of 22 January. "B" Co., of the 38th Arm'd Inf. Bn., was sent toward ST VITH as a reconnaissance in force during the right 22-23 January. They reached the outskirts of the town but were forced back upon encountering a road block defended by artillery and machine gun fire.

The original plan of attack gave Combat Command "R" the mission of taking ST. VITH. On 230100 the 48th Arm'd Inf. Bn.,(-) and C/814th TD Bn., were attached to Combat Command "R". Plans were worked out calling for a coordinated attack

employing the 87th Cav. Rcn. Sq. Mecz., the 40th Arm'd Inf. Bn., and two tank companies. At 0930, however, a change was made and Combat Command "A" was given the job of taking ST. VITH and the 48th Arm'd Inf. Bn.,(-), C/814th TD Bn., and C/33rd Arm'd Engr. Bn., were detached from Command "R" and attached to Combat Command "B".

Combat Command "B"'s plan to take ST VITH involved the organization of three task forces as follows:

TF CHAPPUIS was to move parallel to the HUNNINGEN-ST. VITH road and west of it to occupy the southern portion of ST. VITH, while TF BEATY moved astride the HUNNINGEN-ST. VITH road to the northwestern portion of the town. TF RHEA was to attack due south from his position in the woods to the east of HUNNINGEN to take the northeastern part of ST. VITH. Some of the artillery battalions were displaced to support the operation more effectively.

The attack against ST. VITH jumped off at 231415 January, after a heavy artillery preparation. Only moderate ground resistance of small arms and machine gun fire was encountered in the attack although artillery and nebelwerfer fire was very heavy. At 1745 ST. VITH was taken, and defensive positions established around the town. At 2015 an enemy counterattack of infantry and tanks from the southeast was broken up by artillery fire. Another attempt to regain ST. VITH made at 2125 using an estimated 200 infantrymen supported by at least two tanks, was again dispersed by the use of artillery. Once again at 2250 an attack of about a platoon of infantry was repelled.

As had been previously planned, the 424th RCT with its attached 591st FA Bn., C/331st Medical Bn., and C/81st Engr. Bn., was attached to the 7th Armored Division at 231545 January, to relieve the 508th Pcht Inf. Regt. The relief was completed by 2045 at which time the 508th Pcht. Inf. Regt., reverted to the control of the 82nd Airborne Division. At 241100 January, TF RHEA was returned to Command "A" control from Combat Command "B".

On 24[3] January, Combat Command "B" was given the mission of seizing the high ground to the south and southeast of ST. VITH. Task Force ERLENBUSCH (31st Tank Bn., (-A) and the 509th Pcht. Inf. Bn) and Task Force CHAPPUIS (48th Arm'd Inf. Bn., plus A/33rd Arm'd Engr Bn) jumped off at 1630. The snow was so deep and the terrain so bad that the tanks were unable to progress so the whole burden of the attack fell upon the infantry. Part of the objective was taken by nightfall. A task force led by Lt. Col. VINCENT L. BOYLAN, consisting of the 87th Cav. Rcn. Sq. Mecz., plus B and C of the 40th Tank Bn, reconnoitered to the southeast and east pf ST. VITH. D/87th was attached to Combat Command "B" to aid in its attack at 1500.

Combat Command "A" had consolidated its positions on 24 January and prepared plans for an attack to seize and secure WALLERODE. TF RHEA was to take the town, TF GRIFFIN[4] was to capture the high ground to the northwest of the town while TF SEITZ was to secure the high ground to the north of WALLERODE. TF WEMPLE was held in reserve. At 251000 January, the attack began. The advancing troops met heavy small arms, machine gun, artillery, mortar and nebelwerfer fire, but continued until all task forces had taken their objectives by 1725.

The 424th RCT attacked at 240715 to take MEDELL and nearby heights. Fierce small arms, machine gun fire and assault gun fire was received but by 1640 the town was secured. During the day, the elements of Combat Command "B" continued to fight for and consolidate positions on the high ground to the south and southeast of ST. VITH.

38,153For the most part, 26 January was spent in consolidation. C/48th Arm'd Inf. Bn., was cc committed at 0700 and took PRUMERBERG by 0810 in the face of light opposition. The 424th RCT jumped of at 0800 and by 1100 had taken MEYERODE and the high ground to the south of MEYERODE with little opposition taking the town but meeting heavy small arms and machine gun fire in securing the high ground. A limited enemy counterattack was repelled in disorder. Three patrols from the 87th Cav. Rcn. Sq. Mecz., were dispatched from MEYERODE at 1300 to operate to the east. Two of the patrols ran into observed mortar and artillery fire after advancing 1000 yards to the east and were forced back to the line.

The division adjusted its positions on 27 January, preparatory to withdrawing from the sector. The 424th RCT relieved the Second Bn., 517th Pcht. Inf. Regt. completing the relief by 1500, at which time that unit was released from attachment to the 7th Armored Division end reverted to its parent unit. The 424th RCT extended its zone of defense and consolidated its position.

In order that the 82nd Airborne Division which was to attack to the east through the positions of Combat Command "A", would have right flank protection, Combat Command "B" was given the mission of securing the high ground to the east of PRUMERBERG. Elements Third U.S. Army had not come up for that purpose.

After a five-minute artillery the 48th Armored Infantry Battalion commenced to attack at 271007 January, while the 509th Pcht. Inf. Bn., jumped off at 1025. Stiff resistance in the form of dug-in infantry supported by assault guns and artillery held up the attackers. At 1645 the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to Combat Command "B" from

Combat Command "R", to aid in the attack. The 38th Arm'd Inf. Bn., passed through the lines of the 48th Arm'd Inf. Bn., and the 509th Pcht. Inf. Bn., at 280115 January, and seized the high ground by 0355. Elements of the three battalions mopped up, clearing and consolidating the area until 1806.

Relief of the division came on 28 January. Elements of the 82nd Airborne Division passed through the front lines Of Combat Command "A" and the 424th RCT at 0600. The defense of the zone was assumed by the 82nd Airborne Division at 0815. Relief of Combat Command "B" by the 2nd and 3rd Bns of the 345th Inf. Regt., 87th Inf. Div., began at 2200, and was completed by 290815 January. The 424th RCT upon being withdrawn the was relieved from attachment to the 7th Armored Division and reverted to 106th Inf. Div. control at 281600 January.

After being relieved from the ST. VITH sector, the division was ordered to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of EUPEN. Combat Command "R" and Div. Trps. closed in the new assembly area on 28 January. Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" reached the new area at 290815 and 291830 January, respectively. On 291330 January, the 7th Armored Division was detached from the XVIII Corps (Airborne) and attached to the V Corps. The 509th Pcht. Inf. Bn. reverted to the control of the XVIII Corps (Airborne) upon withdrawal from the line. The 987th FA Bn., was detached in place at 290600 January, and reverted to Corps control.

The month ended with the division conducting maintenance of vehicles and equipment, and rehabilitation of personnel.

During the month of January, 1945, the 7th Armored Division was under the control of the First U. S. Army. On 281330 January, it was relieved of attachment to the XVIII Corps (Airborne) and attached to the V Corps.

Within the division there were also changes in important positions. On 11 January, Col. WILLIAM S. TRIPLET succeeded Col. DWIGHT A. ROSEBAUM as CO of Combat Command "A". Major ROBERT L. SNYDER replaced Lt. Col. HERMANN P. MEYER as Inspector General on 11 January. On 20 January Major FRANK P. ERESCH became Acting Judge Advocate in place of Lt. Col. JOHN P. OLIVER. Lt. Col. JOHN V. MAXWELL was replaced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on 24 January by Major CHARLES GRANT.

Personnel losses of the division and attached units for the month are as follows:

The enemy lost 1013 men taken as prisoners of by the division during the month of January.

During the period 1 January to 31 January 1945 the Division used the following amount of supplies:

The past month has seen our Division play a major role in two difficult operations, one defensive the other offensive. The splendid manner in which you accomplished your assigned missions in both of these operations reflects great credit upon each officer and enlisted man in the Division and of those units operating with us.

During the period 17 December 1944, to 29 January 1945, you dealt the enemy a telling blow, the box score being estimated as follows:

Through your fighting spirit, courage and devotion to duty you have won the praise and respect of all the civilized world.

I wish to add my sincere, personal appreciation for your accomplishments and sacrifices that have won for the Division such an enviable record.

THE AFTER ACTION REPORTS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (JOURNALS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, AND OVERLAYS, ETC.,) OF THE FOLLOWING COMPONENT AND ATTACHED UNITS OF THE 7TH ARMORED DIVISION:

The report of the 814th TD Bn (SP) (Attached) has been submitted through other channels.

No ground contact was made by the Division until the twentieth of the month. On January 1st, Division Artillery fired on a few targets in the general area to the south of MANHAY, and from that time until January 20, no physical contact was effected between troops of the Division and the enemy.

The period was spent by the intelligence agencies of the Division in preparing for offensive action against the Germans that were continuing their extrication of units from the "bulge" into the Western Front that had resulted from the winter ARDENNES counter-offensive. It was apparent that the enemy was withdrawing much of his motorized force and armor, and the problem at hand was to determine just what forces would be left behind and what line of action they would accept. All indications were that the Germans intended using the forces that had previously held the shoulders of the salient to gain time and space for the further extrication of more important forces. These forces appeared to remain basically unchanged from those that had previously been in contact along the shoulders, many of which had been in contact with the division before its withdrawal to the north of MANHAY - characteristically Volksgrenadier type forces. It further appeared that the armor was being pulled out, there being left behind only such strength as would be required to seal off American penetrations of the lines as they existed.

When the pending sector of operations was made known (that area to be generally to the S and SE of MALMEDY), extensive study was conducted in the area.

Expected forces were met in the Division's drive on January 20. Action too, was basically confirmatory of that expected. The forces met were not of the highest offensive type, although diligent in their efforts of defense, and followed the general lines of recent action in defending against speedy progress in breakthrough, establishing successive strong points of infantry forces backed up by a minimum of armor, primarily assault guns. Artillery, generally speaking, was light; mines, generally speaking, were found only on normal approaches into enemy positions.

On January 20, our forces were able to take DEIDENBERG against only light resistance, but troops moving to the south of the town met with heavier resistance. Forces reported little more than small arms fire, mostly from houses in the southern part of the town; a little mortar and a negligible amount of artillery without the appearance of armor filled out the picture in the DEIDENBERG Sector.

Forces operating towards BORN, however, experienced much stiffer resistance and were unable to occupy the town on January 20. The Germans were defending the town with a substantial force, utilizing small arms and mortar fire supported by an abnormal amount of fire from self-propelled assault guns. There were three tanks also reported in this area. One tank and one self-propelled gun were knocked out in this operation.

During the 20th of January, a total of 115 prisoners were taken, and from the identifications of the forces on the Division front were found to be, basically, the 18 Volks Grenadier and 3 Parachute Divisions, plus stragglers of several odd units that had fallen back into the area and had been either absorbed into units disposed on the ground or formed into battle groups to defend critical points.

A noticeable point of enemy security that had been previously encountered very little was discovered during the day. Many of the prisoners taken had either been completely stripped or had stripped themselves of all documents that would have aided in identifying their units. This lack of factual evidence, however, was a small factor in keeping Division interrogators from determining the units opposing the Division, for the enemy soldiers captured talked openly and freely. The status of morale as expressed in the opinions of the soldiers was generally low, the strengths of the forces to our front seriously depleted from previous engagements, and many of the units without knowledge of the situation - friendly or enemy.

During January, 21, our troops moved well to the South of DEIDENBERG, meeting only token resistance; and forces were able to overcome the enemy resistance in BORN. Resistance was varied during the period over the entire sector of operations. At some points, the enemy heavily engaged our forces and fought until they were either killed or were forced to surrender; at other points, the enemy occupying positions in the path of our forces gave up without a struggle. It appeared that there was a noticeable lack of leadership at some of the points, and the hostile troops virtually awaited our coming so that they might surrender.

BORN was found, prior to final entry, to be occupied by an estimated 200 troops, supported by several assault guns and a few tanks. Artillery over the entire sector was much heavier than during the first day of operations in this area, and mortar fire was also quite heavy at several points. Some Nebelwerfer fire was recorded, too.

During the 21st of January, our troops took 78 prisoners of war, destroyed at least 14 armored vehicles, and damaged several others by artillery fire.

Identifications added additional Divisions to the forces opposing our advance, but with the reduction of strength effected by our attack, probably did not increase the strength facing us to any material extent. The 25 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 12 SS Panzer Division was identified, and it appeared that this force had been thrown in as a stop-gap unit until forces from other sectors could be put into the lines, for about at the same time of the identification of this regiment, there were indications that forces were being dispatched from more quiet sectors for the same job that was being done by this elite (so-called) force. In addition to confirming identifications of the 18 Volksgrenadier and 3 Parachute Divisions, the 246 Volksgrenadier Division was also identified during the day.

January, 22 saw a repeat as far as the tactics of the enemy was concerned. Our forces were able to advance without too much difficulty, meeting only small arms and mortar fire, supported by a limited number of tanks and assault guns. There was some artillery fire, and some anti-tank fire was run into. There appeared to be a total reluctance on the part of the enemy to have his armor engage ours on the ground; the only appearances he made with his armor were at long range and then by supporting fire only. The enemy continued to defend critical focal points with infantry, and usually gave these points up when our forces closed in on them.

Elsewhere within the salient, the enemy was hastening his withdrawal. Air reconnaissance showed at almost any hour of the day

great columns of vehicles of all descriptions leaving the bulge on all roads that lead back to Germany. Many of the columns were actually moving close enough to the fronts of adjacent units for them to be engaged by ground weapons, and the air was attacking constantly all those out of reach of the guns of our neighboring formations. Casualties inflicted on the enemy in this retrograde movement were steadily mounting.

51 prisoners were taken during the period, and their identifications revealed that the 3 Parachute Division was holding to its original sector (that is, to the east of DEIDENBERG, from which our forces had moved to the south), and that the responsibility of defense in the sector to our front was that of the 18 Volksgrenadier and 246 VolksGrenadier Divisions. No contact was made with the Regiment of the 12 SS Panzer Division as during the previous day, probably indicating that its relief had been accomplished and that it, as suspected, was moving to the east. Additional odd units, as previously contacted, continued.

On January, 22, our forces captured intact seven 88mm anti-tank guns which had not been moved from their original emplacements. This, as much as anything that bad been encountered to date, showed at what a low ebb the enemy's transportation facilities were. No attempt had been made at destruction of the pieces, and there was an apple supply of ammunition at the weapons' sites.

January, 23rd brought about the first show of aggression that been made by the enemy during this operation. After our forces had pushed southward and had captured ST VITH against moderate resistance, the enemy began a series of movements up and down the line AMEL - ST VITH, said movements including both armor and infantry. Although nothing but the usual rear guard and focal point resistance centers

had been encountered by our troops up until night fall, the enemy actually launched into offensive action at several points along the front at or shortly after dark. There were no penetrations of our positions, and it seemed that most of efforts were made on a relatively small scale. Artillery and Nebelwerfer fire increased during the day, comparatively speaking.

157 prisoners were taken during January23rd, 1 tank was destroyed, 4 assault guns were destroyed and 1 was captured intact. Identifications of prisoners revealed nothing particularly striking, except that there were more and more odd units appearing in the line. One identification of the 326 Volksgrenadier Division was made - a forerunner to many others that were to come if the suspected dispositions of the division were correct. This division was another of the "sacrifice" outfits protecting the withdrawal from the salient.

The enemy brought a halt to his aggressive operations after a few small-scale attacks on the outskirts of ST VITH after our occupation of that town, all shortly after midnight on 24th January. All of these attempts were in very small strength, and were probably effected for the sole purpose of determining what we were going to do with the town now that we had it. As it had long been a focal point of much of the enemy's activity in the salient because of its situation on the center of a far-reaching network of roads, it was probably believed by the enemy that we would put it to much the same use.

Artillery fire was rather heavier in this period than heretofore. It was believed that we were approaching the positions that had been taken up by the enemy's artillery, therefore bringing us within

range of the pieces (rather than the enemy bringing up any additional artillery strength).

52 prisoners were taken on January 24th, and one 88mm anti-tank gun was captured intact. Two enemy tanks were found, abandoned but destroyed. Most of the prisoners came from the 18 Volksgrenadier Division and several were taken from the 326th, all in the immediate vicinity of ST VITH.

The enemy continued typical delaying tactics on January 25 against our general advance to the east. Numerous centers of resistance were hit - generally as had been encountered during previous days, with infantry forces occupying strong points with support of mortar and artillery fire. No contact with armor was reported except in MEDELL, where a single assault gun supported the infantry force defending the town. Otherwise along the front, the enemy supported the infantry forces with arty, Nebelwerfer, and mortar fire.

Advances made by our forces south of ST VITH met with little or no resistance. Defending forces of WALLERODE offered heavy resistance before the town, but offered little organized fight in the town itself, winding up the day with little but sniping from a few of the buildings in the town.

A heavy toll of prisoners was taken during the day - 319. Of the total number prisoners taken, 183 were from the 404 Volksgrenadier Regiment of the 246 Volksgrenadier Division. The original estimates of strength of this regiment were around 250; the toll exacted during the day in prisoners taken, plus some killed and wounded, removed this formation from the formidable list of forces on the Division front. Most of the other prisoners taken were from odd units with recent affiliation to the Volksgrenadier Divisions in the area,

having arrived as replacements within the past few days from other sectors and from inside Germany.

It appeared from prisoner statements and from all outstanding indications that the enemy had expected our primary attack to be due east from ST VITH, and when our larger force attacked towards the town of WALLERODE, it caught most of the enemy in a great state of unpreparedness. Thus caught, most the most of the enemy chose to surrender rather than fight from unprepared positions.

Against Division operations towards objectives to the east (MEYERODE and the high ground to the south thereof) on January 26, the enemy offered different tempos of resistance. Forces in MEYERODE gave up almost without a fight; those in defense of the high ground to the south were extremely determined, and even launched a small scale counterattack which disintegrated upon the appearance of our armor. Mopping up was continued in the vicinity of WALLERODE which had been occupied during the previous day; the only enemy activity was in the form of intermittent artillery and mortar that fell on the town during most of the day. Troops moving to the east of ST VITH on the main road ran into road blocks and heavy small arms fire.

A total of 83 prisoners was recordef[5] for the day. No new identifications were turned up, confirming further that the German was more interested in gaining time for extricating his forces rather than holding ground previously retaken.

It was on January 26th that a patrol of the troops of the Division operating to the East of ST VITH found a document substantiating to a great extent the theory that the enemy was drawing from the immediate sector all of the so-classified "elite"

panzer troops. The order was issued by the commander of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, and it ordered the movement of four of the most widely known SS Panzer Divisions (1SS, 2SS, 9SS, 12 SS) from the front. The order was dated January 19, and subsequent developments had altered the effect of the orders, but the document afforded higher headquarters an insight on the enemy's intentions.

January 27 brought little change in the attitude of the enemy forces to the Division front. His defensive attitude was still paramount, and the nature and location of his little centers of defense indicate that he was playing for the time necessary to man a defense line in strength somewhere to the east, certainly the next logical line - the SEIGFRIED defenses. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire was recorded over the general front, primarily interdictory in nature, directed at the towns (and roads from them) that we occupied on the main roads running eastward. Severe resistance was offered to any attempt that we made to advance more to advance more to the east on the road from ST VITH.

36 prisoners were taken on January 27; no new identification were made. Many of the prisoners had deserted to our lines, taking advantage of the Safe Conduct Leaflets that we had fired into their lines. Morale of the enemy prisoners was at a low ebb; they were suffering from the cold, had inadequate clothes, were without food and had been for varying periods, and were generally of the opinion that they were playing a losing game. It was interesting to note, however, that most of them were fairly well supplied with ammunition and that the weapons that they had were not below previous standards. It appeared that the enemy's supply system could not afford the front line soldiers all items that were needed, so their supply had been limited to the things that were necessary to the

Continuance of their individual fighting. Many of them were under orders simply to defend where they were until the last round had been fired.

On January, 28, most of the troops of the Division were relieved in the line; only those forces astride the road to the east out of ST VITH remained in position. Troops, before being relieved, reported less artillery and mortar fire than during previous days, and the troops that remained in the line reported an almost total absence of both mortar and artillery by the time they had reached their most advanced positions. Heavy machine gun and rifle fire was encountered before the troops reached these points, however.

17 prisoners were taken during the period. Again, no new identifications were made of the prisoners taken.

Prior to the time of final relief of the remaining forces in the line on January 29, our troops reported nothing as to enemy activities except sporadic mortar and artillery fire and some small arms fire. Seven prisoners were recorded for this final day of action.

The remaining days of the month were spent in preparing for any eventual moves that might be made in the sector to the front of the corps to which the division was then assigned (V Corps). Activities of the enemy in the area had been quite parallel to those that the Division had been encountering. The basic differences in the picture in the new area of interest were that there were forces of the same type but in better defensive positions, and that terrain more highly favored the enemy's defense. Approaches into enemy territory led through the outer ring of the SEIGFRIED defenses and to the ROER river line and the lakes that made up the river's head-waters. Enemy tactics were generally unchanged; it appeared that he was going to sell his troops for time and space.

[1] Transcribed by Wesley Johnston (wwjohnston@aol.com) from the original in the National Archives Record Group 407, Box 15545, Folder 10. Spellings are left as in the original. Please contact me if you want to confirm any of the transcription, since I have almost certainly made errors somewhere.

[2] This spelling is as in the original.

[3] This appears to have been "27" overtyped with "24".

[4] CO 38 AIB, Lt. Col. Marcus Griffin

[5] This spelling is as in the original.